Can’t work or won’t work: quasi-experimental evidence on work search requirements for single parents by Avram, Silvia et al.
Labour Economics 51 (2018) 63–85 
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 
Labour Economics 
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/labeco 
Can’t work or won’t work: Quasi-experimental evidence on work search 
requirements for single parents ☆
Silvia Avram a , Mike Brewer a , b , Andrea Salvatori a , c , ∗ 
a University of Essex, Colchester UK 
b Institute for Fiscal Studies, London, UK 
c Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris, France 
a r t i c l e i n f o 
JEL classiﬁcation: 
H53 
I38 
J64 
Keywords: 
Single parents 
Active labour market policy 
Work search conditionalities 
Disability beneﬁts 
a b s t r a c t 
Increasing the labour market participation of single parents, whether to boost incomes or reduce welfare spending, 
is a major policy objective in a number of countries. This paper presents causal evidence on the impact of work 
search requirements on single parents ’ transitions into work and onto other beneﬁts. We use rich administrative 
data on all single parent welfare recipients, and apply a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences approach that exploits the 
staggered roll-out of a reform in the UK that gradually decreased the age of the youngest child at which single 
parents lose the right to an unconditional cash beneﬁt. Consistent with the predictions of a simple search model, 
the work search requirements have heterogeneous impacts, leading some single parents to move into work, but 
leading some (especially those with weak previous labour market attachments) to move onto disability beneﬁts 
(with no search conditionalities) or non-claimant unemployment. 
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0. Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, several countries have extended to sin-
le parents various activation policies which are commonly directed at
he unemployed at large (for reviews and discussion of active labour
arket policies, see OECD, 2007; Bergemann and van den Berg, 2008;
ichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2008; Immervoll and Scarpetta, 2012; Card
t al., 2015; Brown and Koetti, 2015; Eichhorst and Konle-Seidl, 2016 ).
ne central element of these policies is the imposition of work search
equirements for single parents who claim beneﬁts, with the aim of in-
reasing the ﬂow into employment. Previous work has shown that work
earch requirements might induce individuals with low level of labour
arket attachment to give up search entirely and join the ranks of those
ot in employment nor on beneﬁts ( Manning, 2009; Petrongolo, 2009 ).
his casts doubt on the eﬀectiveness of search conditionalities for sin-
le parents, a socio-demographic group that tends to have low levels of
abour market participation. 
In this paper, we present new causal evidence on the impact of the
ntroduction of work search requirements on the probability of welfare-
eceiving single parents moving oﬀ welfare and into work. We exploit
he staggered roll-out of a reform recently implemented in the UK, and☆ The views expressed are those of the authors only and should not be taken to represent the
nd Social Research Council (ESRC) through the Research Centre on Micro-Social Change (MiS
 New Opportunities for Research Funding Agency Co-operation in Europe Network) Welfare Sta
nd Pensions. 
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927-5371/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article undenown as “Lone Parents Obligations ” (LPO). In a series of discrete jumps,
he reform gradually lowered the age of the youngest child which trig-
ers a move from a regime of unconditional income support to a regime
ith work search requirements. We use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences set-
ing with rich administrative data on beneﬁt receipt and spells of em-
loyment, using single parents with younger children as an unaﬀected
roup, and using a long span of pre-reform data on single parents with
imilarly-aged children. The staggered nature of this roll-out – which
ﬀectively means we study not just one but a series of reforms aﬀect-
ng diﬀerent groups at diﬀerent times – provides reassurance that our
esults are not due to a time-varying shock diﬀerentially aﬀecting the
reatment or comparison groups. The large and rich administrative data
eans we pay particular attention to heterogeneous treatment eﬀects.
e ﬁnd that work search conditionalities increased the ﬂow of single
arents into work, but also caused a large proportion of single mothers to
ove onto health-related beneﬁts or into non-claimant unemployment.
he nature of this response is related to previous labour market experi-
nce in ways that are consistent with standard models of job search. 
Our research contributes to the literature examining the impact of
assive or active labour market policies for single parents, and to the
iterature estimating the impact of work search requirements for the views of the OECD or its member countries. This work was supported by the Economic 
oC) at the University of Essex, grant number ES/L009153/1 , by the NORFACE ERA-NET 
te Futures Programme, Grant Number 462-14-010 , and by the UK Department for Work 
2017 
r the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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2 Some of these alternative beneﬁts might bear initial take-up costs that are greater than nemployed or those on social assistance. The literature on single par-
nts concludes that broad activation policies that have included work
earch requirements reduce the beneﬁt count, increase employment
nd reduce poverty among single parents. 1 But there is also evidence
hat the eﬀects of such reforms are heterogeneous and some single par-
nts are made worse oﬀ. In the US, for example, welfare reforms are
hought to have led to a substantial increase in the proportion of “dis-
onnected ” single mothers who are not in work nor on beneﬁts ( Blank,
007 ). But the comprehensive nature of the reforms evaluated in this
iterature makes it diﬃcult to disentangle the eﬀects of the individual
rovisions: the 1996 US reform, which has been the subject of a large
umber of studies, simultaneously introduced time limits, work search
equirements and sanctions ( Moﬃtt, 2008 ), as well as giving states con-
iderable discretion in designing the welfare system. An important fea-
ure of the UK reform, and therefore an important contribution of our
tudy, is that it allows us to focus on eﬀects of work search require-
ents (backed up with the threat of sanctions) separately from other
hanges to the beneﬁt, tax credit or welfare-to-work system. There is
lso a much smaller literature on the impact of activating recipients of
ocial assistance beneﬁts, which in many European countries have tradi-
ionally been “inactive ” beneﬁts (unlike unemployment insurance bene-
ts). For example, Brodersen (2015) examines the impact of fortnightly
eetings with case workers for social assistance recipients in Denmark,
ahlberg et al. (2009) examines the impact of activating welfare re-
ipients in Stockholm, and Bolvig et al. (2003) estimates the impact of
iﬀerent sorts of activation policies for welfare recipients in Aarhus.
omparing the results of these studies to each other and to our own,
hough, is diﬃcult, in part because there is considerable heterogeneity
ot just in what was involved by activation, but also by the composition
f those receiving social assistance beneﬁts. 
The literature estimating the impact of work search requirements for
he unemployed is too large for us to summarise, but two very relevant
tudies are Manning (2009) and Petrongolo (2009) , which both study
he introduction of work search requirements for the unemployed in the
K (with the introduction of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) in 1996). Both
tudies ﬁnd the JSA reform to have moved people oﬀ unemployment
eneﬁts, but not into work, with large ﬂows into non-claimant unem-
loyment and beneﬁts for those with disabilities or poor health (we call
hese “health-related beneﬁts ” hereafter). These ﬁndings are consistent
ith a simple search model that predicts that some claimants might ﬁnd
he search requirements too burdensome and give up search entirely.
s Manning (2009) shows, this is likely to be the case for individuals
ith initial low level of search, for whom the marginal cost of the extra
earch eﬀort might exceed the expected beneﬁt. And there are plausible
easons to think that single parents might be disproportionately found
n this group. For example, single parents may have lower expected re-
urns compared to the typical unemployed for given search eﬀort, due
o the longer average duration of their jobless spells (which might lower
oth the probability of an oﬀer being made and the wage oﬀered), or
ecause, for a given job oﬀer rate, they will accept only jobs with ﬂex-
ble arrangements or part-time hours that allow them to manage their
hildcare duties. If this is the case, the additional work search require-
ents could induce a signiﬁcant ﬂow towards beneﬁts with no search1 See Moﬃtt (2008) for a review of the evidence for the US, but also Fok and 
cVicar (2013) and Gong and Breunig (2014) , who study a reform similar to LPO in 
ustralia, Mogstad and Pronzato (2012) who study a related reform from Norway, and 
noef and van Ours (2016) for 2 reforms in the Netherlands. Dolton and Smith (2011) ex- 
mine an earlier UK reform (known as “New Deal for Lone Parents”, or NDLP) in 
he UK that introduced a voluntary programme of work search counselling, and use 
he same administrative data on beneﬁt receipt as we do, except that their data pre- 
ates the existence of tax credits, from which we draw our measure of employment. 
lundell et al. (2014) brieﬂy considers the impact of reform we study on single parents ’
mployment rates, but their analysis identiﬁes the impact of LPO from deviations from a 
inear time trend in employment rates, with no explicit comparison group to net out com- 
on labour market shocks, and without considering the precise rules determining when 
ndividual single parents were aﬀected. 
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64 onditionalities or towards non-claimant unemployment. 2 Hence, both
he literature on the impact of comprehensive activation policies on sin-
le parents and that on the impact of work search requirements on the
nemployed at large suggest that introduction of search conditionali-
ies for single parents might not achieve the intended aim of increasing
abour market participation for this group. 
We contribute to this issue by studying a reform that gradually re-
uced, from 16 to 7, the age of the youngest child at which a single
arent loses her (or his, but we use female pronouns throughout) enti-
lement to the unconditional income support beneﬁt (a further extension
o age 5 took place in a period not covered by our data). The intention
as that, once the youngest child had reached this age, single parents
hat wanted to receive welfare beneﬁts would have to claim the unem-
loyment beneﬁt, although they could also claim health-related beneﬁts
f they met the medical conditions. The unemployment beneﬁt, known
s Jobseekers Allowance (JSA), can be claimed indeﬁnitely (subject to a
eans-test on income and ﬁnancial assets), but claimants are required
o look for work actively, report to a welfare oﬃce at least fortnightly,
nd, like most “active ” beneﬁts, can be sanctioned for not making suf-
cient eﬀorts to look for work, or for turning down job oﬀers without
ood reason. 3 There were no other diﬀerences between the uncondi-
ional income support beneﬁt and the unemployment beneﬁt: both are
dministered by the same agency and a family’s entitlements to both
hould be identical. 
We show that the introduction of work search conditionalities did
ncrease the ﬂow of single parents into work, but also caused a large pro-
ortion of single mothers to move onto health-related beneﬁts or into
on-claimant unemployment (in the sense that they are not observed
ither in work or on beneﬁts in our dataset). In fact, the ﬂow towards
ither of the two states with no work search requirements attached is
enerally larger than that into work. For example, nine months after
he loss of entitlement to the unconditional income support, the reform
as increased the probability that a previously welfare-receiving single
arent is in work by about 10pp, but has also increased the probabil-
ty of receiving either health-related beneﬁts or being in non-claimant
nemployment by about 18pp. The nature of this response is related
o previous labour market experience: those with lower labour mar-
et attachment (proxied for by the fraction of time a single parent has
pent on welfare beneﬁts before being aﬀected by the reform) are more
ikely to move into non-claimant unemployment and particularly onto
ealth-related beneﬁts, than those with stronger labour market attach-
ent. Point estimates suggest that lone parents with low labour market
ttachment were also more likely to move into work, but the diﬀer-
nces by previous labour market attachment are not statistically signiﬁ-
ant. That the impact of work search requirements might vary with the
ork-readiness of the single parents is consistent with the search model
f Manning (2009) and Petrongolo (2009) , and our empirical ﬁndings
cho the one of an increase in the proportion of “detached ” mothers
ound in the US ( Blank, 2007 ), although we are not able to examine
he reform’s impact on incomes or poverty. Our ﬁndings also, there-hose for the unconditional income support. For example, health-related beneﬁts might 
equire medical examinations. By introducing search requirements for lone parents, the 
eform lowers the relative up-front cost of taking up health-related beneﬁts ( Reiso 2014 ). 
3 There is an extensive literature that seeks to estimate the causal impact of being 
anctioned, or the causal impact of receiving unemployment beneﬁts under a sanction- 
ng regime (for example, see: Arni et al., 2015; Lalive et al., 2008; Rosholm and Svarer, 
008; Abbring et al., 2005 ). An important feature of the JSA regime in the UK is that 
laimants are required to undertake work search and related activities, and can be sanc- 
ioned if they do not comply with the terms of their “jobseeker’s agreement ”, and so part 
f the impact of the LPO reform could be due to the act of being sanctioned, or the threat 
f being sanctioned. However, we lack data on who is sanctioned, and so we cannot con- 
ribute directly to this literature ( Appendix C documents that about 3-5 percent of lone 
arents receiving JSA were sanctioned in each month, with sanctions typically lasting 1, 
, or 4 weeks); instead, our results should be seen as the overall impact of moving single 
arents to a regime where they are required to attend fortnightly meetings and undertake 
ork search activities, backed up by the threat of sanctions. 
S. Avram et al. Labour Economics 51 (2018) 63–85 
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t  ore, contribute to the literature that documents important interactions
etween (or substitutions between) programmes to support those with
oor health (such as the DI programme in the US) and programmes to
upport the unemployed: in addition to works already cited, see also,
or example, Lammers et al. (2013), Reiso (2014) (who also ﬁnds that
ctivation reforms for single parents induced a signiﬁcant ﬂow towards
ealth-related beneﬁts), Brodersen (2015) , and Lindner (2016) for re-
ent empirical evidence, and Lawson (2015) for an assessment for how
his aﬀects the optimal design of UI. We discuss in Section 5 the rela-
ionship between our ﬁndings and the literature on how in-work beneﬁts
ﬀect lone parents ’ employment. 4 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 explains the
eform. Section 3 describes our empirical approach, while Section 4 de-
cribed the data and gives a descriptive overview of the outcomes of the
ingle parents aﬀected by the reform. Section 5 presents our estimates
f the impact of the reform, and Section 6 concludes. 
. The introduction of work search requirements on single 
arents in the UK: the LPO reform 
The UK is the OECD country with the highest share of families
eaded by a sole parent (25.9% in 2004, and the highest proportion
f children living in such families (24.1% in 2004, ( OECD, 2011 )). Fur-
hermore, at the time this reform was being debated, the employment
f single parents in the UK was considerably lower than the OECD aver-
ge, and the poverty rate considerably high, facts that OECD (2011) at-
ributes to the inability of the (pre-reform) income support system to
lleviate poverty among non-working single parents. 5 
It was this context that led to the Lone Parent Obligations (LPO) re-
orm, which eﬀectively introduced work search requirements for single
arents who claim welfare beneﬁts. 6 It did this by gradually reducing
rom 16 to 5 the age of the youngest child at which a single parent loses
er entitlement to the unconditional income support beneﬁt (known as
ncome Support, or IS). To maintain the same level of income after IS
uns out, single parents would then need to claim the beneﬁt for the
nemployed (known as Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA)), and be subject to
he same work search requirements as any other unemployed claimant.
mportantly, there are no major diﬀerences between the unconditional
ncome support beneﬁt and the unemployment beneﬁt except that the
atter requires recipients to undertake job search activities: both pro-
rammes are administered by the same agency, and the size of payment
o which a family is entitlement should be the same for both because
he design of the means-tests is identical. Alternatively, single parents
ho satisﬁed the eligibility conditions could claim a beneﬁt intended
or those deemed unable to work through ill-health or disability (we
all these “health-related beneﬁts ”; the main one in the period we study
as called Employment and Support Allowance (ESA)). Single parents ’
ntitlement to other welfare beneﬁts or tax credits, such as the Child
ax Credit, Housing Beneﬁt and Council Tax Beneﬁt, was unaﬀected by
PO. Single parents who move into work of at least 16 h a week were
ble to claim in-work tax credits; this was also unaﬀected by the LPO re-
orm. Before the reform’s introduction, the UK government expect it to
ead to net ﬁscal savings, with the additional tax revenues from working4 See Brewer et al. (2006) , Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) , and 
regg et al. (2009) for UK evidence, and Nicols and Rothstein (2016) for a review of 
S evidence. 
5 The employment rate of single parents in the mid 2000s was 56%, compared with 
1% for mothers living with or married to a partner; the proportion of individuals from 
one parent families with less than 60% of the median equivalised income was 50% 
n 2006-2008, compared with 23% for those in two-parent families with children (em- 
loyment rates from ONS analysis at http://tinyurl.com/j7k4nsu; poverty rates from 
ttp://www.poverty.org.uk/05/index.shtml ). 
6 The LPO policy reform could be classiﬁed either as “work search assistance”, or as 
threat/sanctions” in Card et al.’s classiﬁcation; and has elements of the “activation and 
orkfare”, “sanctions”, “work search assistance” and “counselling and monitoring” cate- 
ories in the Brown and Koetti classiﬁcation. 
i  
u  
m  
t  
t  
p
ﬁ
n
k
a
c
65 one parents plus the reduction in spending on beneﬁts and tax credits
eaching £150–300 m in its ﬁrst three years (para 8 of DWP (2007) ). 
Hence, following the reform, as their youngest child reached a cer-
ain age, single parents who were not in work of at least 16 hours a
eek had a choice between claiming unemployment beneﬁts subject to
tandard work search requirements (backed up with the threat of sanc-
ions), claiming health-related beneﬁts if they were in suﬃciently poor
ealth or disabled, or accepting a signiﬁcant reduction in their income
in 2009–10, a single parent with one (two) child(ren) that did not re-
eive any of IS, JSA or ESA would be entitled to £3820 (£6741) a year
rom child beneﬁt and child tax credit. IS or JSA would add a further
3344. Foregoing IS or JSA therefore means a reduction in income of
7% (33%) for a single parent with 1 (2) child(ren). 7 A small number of
ingle parents were exempt from LPO, meaning that they could continue
o claim the unconditional IS: these were single parents who were the
esignated full-time Carer of a disabled person, single parents who had
 child who is severely disabled, and those who were fostering children
our data allow us to identify only the ﬁrst of these, and we exclude such
ingle parents from our analysis sample). 
The LPO policy was phased in between November 2008 and late
012. In this period, the age of the youngest child at which a single par-
nt lost her entitlement to IS fell in a series of discrete jumps ( Appendix A
rovides the precise information on the dates on which single parents
ost entitlement to IS according to the date of birth of their youngest
hild). Oﬃcially, each of these discrete jumps was called a sub-phase,
nd these sub-phases were grouped into several Phases. The data avail-
ble to us allows us to estimate the impact of LPO on single parents
hose youngest child was between 16 and 7, covering Phases 1 to 3;
e do not have data covering the period where single parents whose
oungest child was aged 5 to 7 were aﬀected by the reform. 
. Empirical strategy 
.1. Empirical strategy 
Our aim is to estimate the impact of LPO on single parents who were
xisting claimants of the unconditional income support beneﬁt (IS), and
o estimate how LPO changed their subsequent employment and welfare
eceipt. 8 We do this with a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design, where we
bserve outcomes for single parents with older children (the treatment
roup) and with younger children (the comparison group), and who
re drawn from one of six cohorts spanning a 8 year period, the last of
hich is aﬀected by LPO, and the ﬁrst ﬁve of which are observed before
PO. We explain below precisely how these were constructed, and our
pproach to inference. 
.1.1. Constructing the treatment and comparison groups 
For each sub-phase, the treated group is made up of the single par-
nts whose youngest child’s date of birth falls into various windows, as
et out in Appendix A . We then assume that the LPO policy regime could
ave aﬀected lone parent’s behavior beginning from 12 months before
he loss of entitlement to IS, and so our treated group for each sub-phase
s deﬁned as single parents whose youngest child was born in a partic-
lar window, as set out in Appendix A , and who were receiving IS 12
onths before the projected date on which they would lose entitlement
o IS. Single parents were oﬃcially notiﬁed of their loss of entitlement
o IS with 12 months’ notice, and received more frequent counselling7 Separate beneﬁts are available to cover the cost of rental housing and local 
roperty taxes. Beneﬁt rates are taken from http://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_and_resources/ 
scal_facts/ . 
8 We do not look at how the reform aﬀected on-ﬂows to welfare from those previously 
ot receiving welfare. Although we observe the universe of welfare claims, we do not 
now how many lone parents there are in the population with children of diﬀerent ages, 
nd so we could not tell whether a change in the number of new claims of welfare was a 
hange in the rate of new claims. 
S. Avram et al. Labour Economics 51 (2018) 63–85 
m  
q  
a  
h  
a  
p  
L  
c  
t
 
d  
m  
t  
e  
1  
l  
(
 
e  
i  
t  
w  
b  
g  
L  
t  
t  
e  
2
 
c  
d  
a  
y  
t  
t  
a  
t  
t  
y  
a  
b  
p  
p  
w  
t  
y  
2  
t  
F  
a  
t  
t  
t
 
l  
a  
s  
m  
c  
w  
s  
y
r
t  
t  
e  
t  
i  
d
3
 
L  
o  
a  
t  
a
 
n
𝑦  
w  
a
 
g  
a  
d  
c
𝛿  
 
c  
a  
i  
X  
e  
p  
p  
s  
w  
o
 
f  
i  
t  
o  
I  
s  
T  
t  
v  
c
10 There are 12 data points and 8 coeﬃcients. We do not make any allowance for es- 
timation error in the ﬁrst step; Table 1 shows the size of the post-reform treated groups 
in each sub-phase, the smallest of which has over 7,000 observations. Figs. 2 –4 show a 
considerable degree of stability in the estimates of the pre-reform diﬀerences between 
outcomes for the treatment and comparison group, which suggests that sampling error in 
the set of 𝛿𝑔 coeﬃcents is negligible. 
11 We included: indicator variables for each travel-to-work area; a measure of the relative 
deprivation or aﬄuence of the single parent’s area of residence (this was the ward-level 
rank of the Index of Multiple Deprivation, measured separately for England and Wales, eetings with their Case Worker (although without any work search re-
uirements) in the 12 months leading up to the loss of entitlement. Our
pproach therefore counts this period as part of the LPO treatment (we
ave no direct information on single parents ’ awareness of the reform
s in, for example, van den Berg et al. (2009) ). However, some single
arents in our treated sample might not actually have been aﬀected by
PO when the time came for them to lose entitlement to IS, either be-
ause their entitlement to IS had been extended (most usually because
hey had another child), or because they had stopped receiving IS. 
We then deﬁne an observation window that lasts 36 months from this
ate (i.e. the observation window begins 12 months before and ends 24
onths after the date on which they were projected to lose entitlement
o IS), or until 30 September 2011, when our data is right-censored. For
xample, a single parent with a youngest child born between 1 February
999 and 26 October 1999 would be in sub-phase 2aF, and would have
ost entitlement to IS between 25 October 2010 and 25 October 2011
on a date that depended on the child’s precise birth date). 
For each sub-phase, the comparison group was deﬁned as single par-
nts whose youngest child turns 4 during the window of calendar time
n which the treated single parents lost entitlement to IS. For example,
he comparison group for sub-phase 2aF is made up of single parents
hose youngest child turns 4 between 25 October 2010 and 25 Octo-
er 2011. This is the oldest age that we can choose for the comparison
roup’s youngest children whilst ensuring that they are unaﬀected by
PO during the full observation window. 9 As with the treatment group,
he observation period for the comparison group starts 12 months before
his date, so it begins on the third birthday of the youngest child, and
nds on the sixth birthday of their youngest child, or on 30 September
011. 
We then produce equivalent pre-reform cohorts of the treated and
omparison groups by selecting single parents whose youngest chil-
ren were the same age as the actual treated and comparison group
nd whose birthday fell in the same months of the year, but in earlier
ears. (This is equivalent to following the rules above for constructing
he treatment and comparison groups, but pretending that LPO was in-
roduced in earlier years). To ensure that all of our pre-reform cohorts
re unaﬀected by LPO throughout their 36 month observation window,
he latest pre-reform cohort is selected to be 4 years earlier than the ac-
ual treated group; additional pre-reform cohorts are drawn from earlier
ears. The constraints that our data is available only from summer 1999
nd that in our regressions we control for the amount of time spent on
eneﬁts or work in the 36 months before the start of the observation
eriod mean that we can use at most 5 cohorts from the pre-reform
eriod. For example, for the treated group that includes single parents
hose youngest child turned 11 between 25 October 2010 and 25 Oc-
ober 2011, the latest pre-reform cohort includes single parents whose
oungest child turned 11 between 25 October 2006 and 25 October
007; the next pre-reform cohort between 25 October 2005 and 25 Oc-
ober 2006, and so forth, and we do the same for the comparison group.
inally, we drop all single parents who were receiving Carer’s Allowance
t the start of the observation window, as this group was exempt from
he LPO reform, and those aged over 57 at the start of the window (as
hese women would become entitled to a state pension payments during
he observation window). 
One possible objection to our design is that a standard dynamic
abour supply model would predict individuals would respond as soon
s they realise that LPO reform means that their entitlement to income
upport will end earlier than they had anticipated. In theory, this would
ean that we could not rule out that the reform had an impact on the
omparison group in the post-reform period (and any such response
ould likely result in our estimates being downwardly biased). Our de-
ign does not allow us to test this directly, but we ﬁnd it implausible9 We also checked the robustness of our results to using a control group with the 
oungest child aged 5 and reducing the observation period to 2 years. The results, not 
eported here, are in line with those included in this paper. 
p
P
v
y
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66 hat any such response would be of a meaningful magnitude, given that
his is likely to be a myopic, credit constrained population, and that our
stimated impacts for Phase 1 – where the comparison group are the fur-
hest away in time from losing their entitlement to beneﬁts – show very
mpacts 9 months before the loss of entitlement that are insigniﬁcantly
iﬀerent from zero. 
.1.2. Empirical speciﬁcation and inference 
We apply the two-step procedure suggested in Donald and
ang (2007) to produce coeﬃcient estimates and p-values. If we think
f a group as being deﬁned by the interaction of cohort dummies with
n indicator for being in the treatment group, then this addresses the
win problems that our variable of interest is constant within a group,
nd that we have relatively few groups (we have at most 12). 
In the ﬁrst step, we partial-out the individual-level covariates by run-
ing the following equation on the full micro-data: 
 𝑖 ( 𝑔 ) = 𝑋 𝑖 𝜁 + 
12 ∑
𝑔=1 
𝛿𝑔 𝐼 𝑔 + ∈𝑖 (1)
here I g is an indicator variable for individual i belonging to group g ,
nd X i is a vector of individual-level controls. 
In the second step, the dependent variable is the set of estimated
roup coeﬃcients, 𝛿𝑔 , and these are regressed on cohort dummies, I c ,
 treatment group dummy, and the interaction of the treatment group
ummy with being in the ﬁnal, post-reform, cohort (with 𝛽2 being the
oeﬃcient of interest): 
𝑔 = 
6 ∑
𝑐=1 
𝛾𝑖 𝐼 𝑐 + 𝛽1 𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑡 𝑔 + 𝛽2 𝑇 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛 𝑡 𝑔 ∗ 𝐼 ( 𝑐 = 6 ) + 𝑢 𝑔 . (2)
Following Donald and Lang (2007) , inference in this second step is
arried out using the t-distribution with 4 degrees of freedom. 10 This
pproach should ensure that the true size of the tests is close to the nom-
nal size if there is no dependence between the 12 clusters. The vector
 i includes the individual-level variables (age and gender of single par-
nt, number of children, ethnicity of single parent, whether the single
arent suﬀers from ill health or a disability, and summary measures of
ast employment and welfare receipt) and geographical variables which
hould control for time-invariant diﬀerences in local labour markets, as
ell as time-varying diﬀerences either due to changing labour markets
r to any changes in the policy of local employment oﬃces. 11 
As outcomes, we use “in employment ” and receipt of various wel-
are beneﬁts intended for non-working recipients, measured at 6 month
ntervals, beginning 9 months before the date of the predicted loss of en-
itlement to IS (or 3 months after the sample is drawn), and with a ﬁnal
utcome measured 24 months after the predicted loss of entitlement to
S (36 months after the sample is drawn). Eqs. (1) and (2) are estimated
eparately for each outcome, and for each sub-phase of LPO, by OLS.
o help summarise the results, we also estimate a variant that pools all
he sub-phase samples for each of the 3 main Phases, and we estimate a
ariant of (2) that allows for separate linear trends in the treatment and
omparison groups. lus an indicator for being in Scotland); a set of indicator variables for each Jobcentre 
lus district interacted with cohort.) It is possible that the impact of the reform might 
ary across areas depending on the availability of childcare, particularly for parents whose 
oungest child is under 13, but we do not know of good data measuring the geographical 
ariation in the availability or price of childcare for school-age children in the UK. 
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f
12 The information on a claimant’s hours worked is needed only for determining entitle- 
ment to the Working Tax Credit, but typically the Working Tax Credit is claimed jointly 
with the Child Tax Credit, and so we refer to the two together as “tax credits” (for example, 
someone who wants to claim only the Child Tax Credit, knowing that they earn too much 
to be entitled to the Working Tax Credit will still be asked to report their weekly hours of 
work when making the claim even though that information is used only for determining 
entitlement to the Working Tax Credit). 
13 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/ﬁn-takeup-stats/cwtc-take-up.pdf . Take-up rates 
are, in general, lower for those entitlement to smaller amounts, but oﬃcial statistics do 
not also break these down by family type. 
14 The outcomes shown for Phase 3 in Fig. 1 are similar to results on destinations from a 
quantitative survey of single parents who lost entitlement to IS in early 2011 ( Coleman and 
Riley. 2012 ). That report estimated that amongst those who left IS, 41% were receiving 
JSA, 13% ESA, 33% were in work, and 9% not on beneﬁt or in work , all measured 12 
months after losing entitlement. .1.3. Threats to internal validity 
We rely on the three standard assumptions of the DiD approach for
he coeﬃcient 𝛽2 to give unbiased estimates of the impact of LPO. First,
e assume that single parents with younger and older children share a
ommon trend in the absence of the treatment. This could be violated if
ther policy changes at the same time as LPO aﬀected the two groups of
ingle parents diﬀerentially. We provide details on potentially relevant
olicy changes (not necessarily speciﬁcally aimed at single parents) in
ppendix B : we do not believe that other policy changes could have
igniﬁcantly altered the diﬀerence in outcomes between single parents
ith older and younger children. In Section 5.1 , we provide evidence
n support of the common trend assumption by showing that the diﬀer-
nce between the treatment and comparison groups in the 5 pre-reform
ohorts is remarkably stable over time. Additionally, the staggered roll-
ut of the reforms we exploit enables us to estimate the impact of the
ntroduction of the work search requirements at diﬀerent points in cal-
ndar time, hence providing reassurance that our results are not driven
y a shock at a particular time diﬀerentially aﬀecting the treatment or
omparison groups. However, as a robustness check, we estimate a vari-
nt that allows outcomes in treatment and comparison groups to have
heir own linear trends. 
The second assumption is that the composition of the treatment and
omparison group does not change over time in a way that could con-
ound the estimate of the eﬀect of interest. Given the limited time span
overed by our data, there are good reasons to believe the homogeneity
f these groups over time. We show in Tables 2 –4 that the treatment and
omparison groups appear very similar in terms of observed characteris-
ics over time (and the inclusion of controls for employment and welfare
eceipt histories can be thought of as acting as a proxy for relevant un-
bservable, as in Card and Sullivan (1988) and Petrongolo (2009) ). 
A third assumption is that the comparison group are not themselves
ﬀected by the treatment. We deﬁned the comparison group deliber-
tely so that they would not be potentially aﬀected by LPO throughout
he three-year window (i.e. that the date on which they would lose eli-
ibility to income support was at least a year after the end of the three
ear observation window). It is possible that the single parents in the
omparison group could have been aﬀected through substitution or dis-
lacement eﬀects due to increased search eﬀort by the single parents
n the treatment group, which would likely result in an upward bias in
he estimate of the impact of the reform on the probability of moving
nto work.We cannot estimate these eﬀects, but we consider that they
re unlikely to be large. 
. Data and descriptive statistics 
.1. Overview 
We use an administrative dataset provided by the UK’s Department
or Work and Pensions (DWP), and known as the Work and Pensions
ongitudinal Study (WPLS). This combines information collected by
WP for administering beneﬁt claims and welfare-to-work programmes
ith information about employment, earnings and tax credit claims col-
ected by the tax authority (HM Revenue and Customs). This data is
atched at the individual level, using a combination of name, date of
irth, address and social security number. the advantage of this dataset
s the very large number of observations, the ability to identify precisely
hen a single parent is due to lose entitlement to IS, and the ability to
rack accurately ﬂows between diﬀerent government programmes. The
ersion of the dataset we used comprised a 100% sample of adults who
ad claimed IS as a single parent at any point since April 1999 in Great
ritain. For these adults, we also observed the dates on which they were
n receipt of any DWP beneﬁt, and information on their claims of tax
redits. We do not observe the amount of entitlements to these beneﬁts
nd tax credits, and nor do we reliably observe earnings, and so we do
ot look at the impact of the reform on spending on welfare programmes
r lone parents ’ income or poverty. 67 The outcome measures that relate to receipt of beneﬁts come di-
ectly from this dataset (having cleaned the data to remove inconsisten-
ies, as described in Appendix D ). But our measure of work needs more
iscussion. We classiﬁed single parents as being “in work ” if they had
laimed tax credits and had reported that they were working 16 or more
ours a week. 12 This will clearly underestimate the true employment
ate amongst these single parents. First, the measure of employment
learly omits instances where single parents did paid work for fewer
han 16 hours a week. But this is not common, partly because welfare
eneﬁts are withdrawn pound-for-pound for single parents who work
ewer than 16 h, but also because the in-work tax credit system pro-
ides a substantial ﬁnancial incentive to work 16 or more hours a week
see, for example, Blundell and Shephard, 2011). Second, our measure
ill also not capture work of 16 h a week or more by single parents
ho did not claim tax credits when in work. Such non-claiming could
e caused either by non-take-up amongst those who were eligible, or
y having too high a family income to be eligible. In practice, we think
oth of these are likely to lead only to small biases: the take-up rate of
ax credits amongst all single parents was estimated to be 95% during
010–11, 13 and a family with children would be entitled to tax credits
ith a combined gross income of up to £58,000 in the period covered by
ur data (the 90th centile of earnings across all employees was £46,293
n 2010–11). 
Table 1 reports the number of single parents in our sample aﬀected
y the reform for each phase and sub-phase alongside with the date
f birth of the youngest child and their age at which the parent loses
ntitlement to IS. Table 2 –Table 4 report summary statistics. The treat-
ent and the comparison groups are similar, but the former tend to be
lder (as expected, given they have older children), exhibit a higher in-
idence of ill-health or disability, and, has spent more time on IS in the
ix months before the observation period. The pre-reform cohorts ap-
ear very similar to their post-reform counterparts: the exception is the
roportion of time spent in work in the 6 months prior to the start of
he observation period, but this is because our measure of work does
ot capture time spent working before April 2003 (in our regressions,
e deal with this by interacting this variable with a ﬂexible control for
ear). 
.2. Outcomes for the aﬀected single parents 
Fig. 1 shows, by Phase, how the main beneﬁt and work outcomes
volved through the 36 month window for the single parents who were
ﬀected by LPO. It characterises single parents as being in one of the
ollowing mutually-exclusive states: 
• Receiving Income Support (IS) with Carer’s Allowance (CA). 
• Receiving the unemployment beneﬁt (JSA). 
• Not receiving JSA but receiving the health-related beneﬁt (ESA). 
• Not receiving JSA or ESA but receiving IS. 
• Not receiving JSA, ESA, IS or CA but in work. 
• Not receiving JSA, ESA or IS but receiving CA. 
• Not receiving JSA, ESA, IS or CA and not in work. 14 
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Table 1 
Deﬁnitions of sub-phases of the LPO reform, and ﬁnal sample size. 
Phase DOB of youngest child IS end date determined by Memo: age of youngest child 
when lose IS entitlement 
Sample size 
Phase 1 stock 25/11/1992 to 01/03/1993 Child’s 16th birthday, from 25/11/2008 to 01/03/2009 Age 16 exactly 7354 
Phase 1i stock 02/03/1993 to 24/11/1993 On ﬁrst of child’s 16th birthday or date of ﬁrst WFI between 
02/03/2009 and 28/08/2009 
Age 15–16 20,302 
Phase 1a stock 25/11/1993 to 01/03/1995 On date of ﬁrst WFI between 02/03/2009 to 28/08/2009 Aged 14–16 37,863 
Phase 1a ﬂow 02/03/1995 to 24/11/1995 Child’s 14th birthday, from 02/03/2009 to 24/11/2009 Age 14 exactly 21,370 
Phase 1b stock 25/11/1995 to 05/07/1997 On date of ﬁrst WFI between 06/07/2009 to 06/01/2010 Aged 12–14 52,648 
Phase 1b ﬂow 6/07/1997 to 24/11/1997 On child’s 12th birthday, from 06/07/2009 to 24/11/2009 Age 12 exactly 13,310 
Phase 1,all 152,847 
Phase 2a stock 25/11/1997 to 31/01/1999 On date of ﬁrst WFI between 01/02/2010 to 01/05/2010 Age 11–12 40,827 
Phase 2a ﬂow 01/02/1999 to 26/10/1999 Child’s 11th birthday, from 01/02/2010 to 26/10/2010 Age 11 exactly 24,850 
Phase 2b stock 27/10/1999 to 06/06/2000 On date of ﬁrst WFI between 07/06/2010 to 07/09/2010 Age 10 21,666 
Phase 2b ﬂow 07/06/2000 to 26/10/2000 Child’s 10th birthday between 07/06/2010 and 26/10/2010 Age 10 exactly 14,172 
Phase 2,all 101,515 
Phase 3a stock 27/10/2000 to 24/10/2001 On date of ﬁrst WFI between 25/10/2010 to 25/01/2011 Age 9–10 36,931 
Phase 3a ﬂow 25/10/2001 to 25/10/2002 Child’s 9th birthday, from 25/10/2010 to 25/10/2011 Age 9 exactly 36,578 
Phase 3b stock 26/10/2002 to 02/01/2004 On date of ﬁrst WFI between 03/01/2011 to 03/04/2011 Age 7–8 53,059 
Phase 3b ﬂow 03/01/2004 to 25/10/2004 Child’s 7th birthday, from 03/01/2011 to 25/10/2011 Age 7 exactly 39,935 
Phase 3,all 28,341 
Source: Authors ’ calculations based on IS History as described in the text. 
Note: The LPO reform was rolled out in consecutive (sub)phases (column 1) which gradually reduced the age of the youngest child at which a lone parent would lose entitlement to IS. 
The second column shows the range of dates in which the DOB of the youngest child fell in each sub-phase, and the third column explains when the lone parent lost entitlement to IS. 
The fourth column indicates the age of the youngest child at the time when their parent lost entitlement to IS. WFI = “work focused interview ”, the name of the meeting between a 
welfare-receiving single parent and their Case Worker. At the time of LPO. WFIs took place every 3 months for those in Phase 2 and 3, and every 6 months for those in Phase 1. 
Table 2 
Summary statistics by group for Phase 1. 
Treatment, post reform 
cohorts 
Comparison, post reform 
cohorts 
Treatment, pre-reform 
cohorts 
Comparison, pre-reform 
cohorts 
All 
Mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Female 0.892 0.311 0.968 0.175 0.867 0.339 0.966 0.181 0.899 0.302 
Age 41.999 6.390 29.333 6.903 41.820 7.112 29.409 6.673 38.233 8.936 
White 0.755 0.430 0.740 0.439 0.670 0.470 0.701 0.458 0.690 0.463 
Number of children 1.577 0.740 1.925 1.108 1.509 0.696 1.962 1.109 1.646 0.864 
Disability 0.402 0.490 0.171 0.376 0.365 0.481 0.203 0.402 0.320 0.467 
Proportion of last 6 months before observation on: 
IS 0.751 0.418 0.624 0.453 0.720 0.437 0.612 0.462 0.692 0.445 
Work 0.122 0.317 0.153 0.343 0.001 0.019 0.000 0.011 0.020 0.136 
JSA 0.010 0.086 0.009 0.077 0.010 0.091 0.008 0.077 0.010 0.087 
ESA 0.127 0.327 0.091 0.274 0.104 0.300 0.069 0.243 0.097 0.289 
Carer’s Allowance 0.098 0.295 0.028 0.161 0.060 0.234 0.021 0.141 0.053 0.221 
Deprivation (England) 0.754 0.237 0.761 0.234 0.759 0.236 0.765 0.232 0.760 0.235 
Deprivation (Wales) 0.302 0.253 0.286 0.249 0.311 0.258 0.292 0.249 0.305 0.255 
Notes and sources: treatment and comparison groups as deﬁned in text. Deprivation is the within-country rank of the ward-level deprivation index. 
Table 3 
Summary statistics by group for Phase 2. 
Treatment, post reform 
cohorts 
Comparison, post reform 
cohorts 
Treatment, pre-reform 
cohorts 
Comparison, pre-reform 
cohorts 
All 
Mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Female 0.920 0.271 0.969 0.173 0.903 0.295 0.966 0.181 0.925 0.263 
Age 39.069 6.664 29.212 6.837 38.568 6.604 29.440 6.743 35.682 7.934 
White 0.748 0.434 0.743 0.437 0.726 0.446 0.709 0.454 0.725 0.447 
Number of children 1.833 0.910 1.923 1.109 1.808 0.884 1.964 1.115 1.858 0.968 
Disability 0.322 0.467 0.163 0.369 0.333 0.471 0.199 0.400 0.287 0.452 
Proportion of last 6 months before observation on: 
IS 0.727 0.431 0.613 0.457 0.729 0.430 0.637 0.453 0.698 0.440 
Work 0.146 0.341 0.178 0.365 0.007 0.072 0.005 0.057 0.029 0.159 
JSA 0.008 0.079 0.009 0.079 0.009 0.085 0.010 0.084 0.009 0.084 
ESA 0.099 0.293 0.086 0.266 0.087 0.277 0.080 0.259 0.086 0.273 
Carer’s Allowance 0.091 0.284 0.028 0.162 0.064 0.242 0.023 0.148 0.054 0.223 
Deprivation (England) 0.747 0.241 0.756 0.237 0.755 0.237 0.765 0.232 0.757 0.236 
Deprivation (Wales) 0.309 0.255 0.301 0.254 0.310 0.255 0.290 0.248 0.304 0.253 
Notes and sources: treatment and comparison groups as deﬁned in text. Deprivation is the within-country rank of the ward-level deprivation index. 
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Fig. 1. Fraction of single parents potentially aﬀected by LPO in diﬀerent labour market or beneﬁt-receiving states, by Phase (top = Phase 1, bottom = Phase 3). 
Notes: Sample construction and other covariates are described in the text. IS = Income Support; ESA = Employment and Support Allowance, or other health-related beneﬁts; JSA = Job- 
seeker’s Allowance; CA = Carer’s Allowance. 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics by group for Phase 3. 
Treatment, post reform 
cohorts 
Comparison, post reform 
cohorts 
Treatment, pre-reform 
cohorts 
Comparison, pre-reform 
cohorts 
All 
Mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Female 0.943 0.232 0.970 0.171 0.931 0.253 0.967 0.178 0.945 0.228 
Age 35.472 7.119 29.310 6.867 35.441 6.778 29.432 6.820 33.333 7.411 
White 0.727 0.445 0.742 0.437 0.738 0.440 0.718 0.450 0.731 0.443 
Number of children 1.956 1.024 1.929 1.102 1.949 1.008 1.955 1.114 1.950 1.047 
Disability 0.231 0.421 0.149 0.356 0.280 0.449 0.195 0.396 0.243 0.429 
Proportion of last 6 months before observation on: 
IS 0.699 0.443 0.584 0.469 0.738 0.423 0.653 0.446 0.700 0.437 
Work 0.169 0.363 0.191 0.383 0.026 0.151 0.028 0.156 0.051 0.211 
JSA 0.008 0.074 0.008 0.071 0.009 0.084 0.011 0.087 0.009 0.083 
ESA 0.079 0.264 0.085 0.263 0.079 0.264 0.089 0.270 0.082 0.266 
Carer’s Allowance 0.072 0.254 0.031 0.169 0.057 0.229 0.025 0.153 0.048 0.210 
Deprivation (England) 0.745 0.243 0.748 0.241 0.756 0.236 0.766 0.231 0.758 0.235 
Deprivation (Wales) 0.300 0.249 0.294 0.251 0.303 0.254 0.288 0.247 0.298 0.251 
Notes and sources: treatment and comparison groups as deﬁned in text. Deprivation is the within-country rank of the ward-level deprivation index. 
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r  Because of the way the sample was constructed, all the single par-
nts are receiving IS at the start of the window, 12 months before the
rojected date on which they lost IS entitlement. The fraction receiving
S falls considerably (by over 50 ppts) at the predicted time of losing
ntitlement (month 0), but some single parents continue to receive IS
fter that date: 6 months after the predicted loss of entitlement, about
0% of potentially aﬀected single parents are still receiving IS in Phases
 and 2, and about 13% in Phase 3. We show in Appendix E that, in just
nder two thirds of these cases, these single parents had experienced a
hange in circumstances which meant that they were no longer aﬀected
y the LPO reform; we are unable to tell whether the remaining cases
eﬂect data inaccuracies or a failure of policy implementation. 
Unsurprisingly, the fraction of single parents receiving JSA or ESA
ises sharply around the projected date on which the single parents lost
S entitlement; the fraction receiving JSA then declines steadily, and the
raction on ESA grows very slightly. The fraction recorded as being in
ork increases steadily from the beginning of the observation window
eginning (i.e. 12 months before the projected loss of IS entitlement) and
here is no discernible jump at the time that single parents are predicted
o lose IS entitlement. 
The diﬀerence between 1 and the shaded areas represents the frac-
ion of the sample not receiving an out-of-work beneﬁt and not recorded
s being in work; this group corresponds to the “disconnected ” single
others identiﬁed by Blank (2007 ) that are not in work nor on bene-
ts, and are likely to include many of those who were made ﬁnancially
orse oﬀ by the reform. The fraction of single parents in this group in-
reases slowly from the beginning of the observation window, but then
umps up by some 2–3 pp at the time of the predicted loss of entitle-
ent to IS; about 15% of single parents were not observed in work nor
n any of the out-of-work beneﬁts at the end of the observation win-
ow. It is not possible to tell, amongst those appearing to receive no
tate support, how many no longer have a dependent child (something
hat substantially reduces entitlements to beneﬁts) or how many have
e-partnered but without claiming tax credits. Our data does not allow
s to tell whether any of these (former) single parents went on to be
he partner of a claimant of an out-of-work beneﬁt (because only the
ain claimant is recorded), but Appendix E shows that between 70%
nd 90% of this group are either not receiving any state support in their
wn right, or are receiving only child tax credits. Conservatively, and in
ine with evidence from an earlier survey, we assess that at least 8% of
ﬀected single parents lost a signiﬁcant proportion of their income from
tate welfare beneﬁts when their entitlement to IS ended, as after that
hey received either child tax credit only, or no state support at all. 15 15 In broad terms, these ﬁndings are consistent with those from a bespoke survey of 
ingle parents aﬀected by Phase 3 of LPO. Of these single parents, whose entitlement to IS 
e
i
t
70 In general, the pattern for the three phases is similar except there
s a larger ﬂow towards health-related beneﬁts in Phase 1, and single
arents in Phase 3 are slightly more likely to remain on IS than those
n the earlier Phases. The diﬀerential pattern for Phase 1 is consistent
ith the incentives engendered by a unrelated beneﬁt reform aﬀecting
ealth-related beneﬁts: from autumn 2008, individuals wanting to claim
n out-of-work beneﬁt on the grounds of ill-health or disability had to
laim a beneﬁt known as Employment and Support Allowance (ESA)
hich had a more exacting medical assessment than its predecessor,
ncapacity Beneﬁt (IB), and this seems to have led to a larger-than-usual
ow of single parents from IS to IB during late 2007 and early 2008.
owever, the pattern is also consistent with single parents in this Phase
eing older, on average, and having spent more time on beneﬁt in the
ast, than those in Phases 2 and 3 (as can be seen by comparing Tables
 – 4 ). The higher fraction that remain on IS in Phase 3 could reﬂect that
ingle parents aﬀected by Phase 3 were more likely to have subsequent
hildren than single parents in earlier Phases, who were older and had
lder children. 
These descriptive results provide a ﬁrst indication that, after the in-
roduction of work search requirements, a fraction of single parents did
ove into work, but a signiﬁcant proportion also moved onto health-
elated beneﬁts or non-claimant unemployment. 
. The estimated impact of LPO on beneﬁt and work outcomes 
.1. A graphical assessment of the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design 
Figs. 2 –4 provide a graphical assessment of the diﬀerence-in-
iﬀerences design. Each graph plots the diﬀerence in the mean outcomes
f the treatment and comparison groups, separately for each of the 6
ohorts, and with outcomes measured 15 months from the start of the
bservation period, 16 and having stripped out the impact of individual-
evel covariates (equivalently, each point represents the diﬀerence be-
ween 𝛿𝑔 and 𝛿ℎ from Eq. (2) , where g and h are the two groups with
iﬀerent treatment statuses from a given cohort). Each Figure consists
f one graph for each sub-phase, along with a summary graph for each
hase, and diﬀerent Figures are for diﬀerent outcomes; a vertical line
eparates the ﬁnal, post-reform, cohort. 
The way we implement the DiD design requires us to assume that
he treatment-comparison group diﬀerences are identical in all 5 pre-
eform cohorts, and that this diﬀerence would represent the unobserved,nded in early 2011, 11% were not in work and not receiving any of IS, ESA or JSA when 
nterviewed 12 months later, half of whom had re-partnered ( Coleman and Riley (2012) ). 
16 For brevity, we report only the results for outcomes measured after 15 months, but 
he conclusions hold for the other outcomes as well. 
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p  ost-reform diﬀerence in untreated outcomes. The second part of this
tatement is untestable, but, in general, Figs. 2 –4 show stable pre-reform
iﬀerences in outcomes, lending support to the assumption of common
rends between the two groups. For example, in Fig. 2 , the diﬀerence in
he probability of being on IS between the treated and the control group
s stable and generally close to zero, but drops to 60pp after the reform. It
s for this reason that our preferred results use the basic DiD speciﬁcation
n Eq. (2) . Estimates of the impact of LPO based on a variant of (2) that
llow for group-speciﬁc linear time trends produced point estimates of
he impact of LPO are always very similar to our standard speciﬁcation;
esults are available on request. 
.2. The diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimates of the impact of LPO 
In this section we report our estimated impacts of LPO, as given by
he coeﬃcient 𝛽2 from Eq. (2) , for the diﬀerent outcomes. 
Table 5 reports the DiD estimates of the impact of the introduction
f work search requirements on the probability that a single parent is
n the unconditional beneﬁt, income support (IS), at diﬀerent points
n time. The estimates suggest that the reform began to induce some
ingle parents to leave IS at least three months before the predicted
ate of their loss of IS entitlement (column 2); this response is larger for
he earlier Phases. But the main impact occurs around the time of the
redicted loss of entitlement: three months after this date, the reform
as reduced the probability of being on IS by 46pp in Phase 1, and by
ver 55pp in Phases 2 and 3. These impacts are below 100 pp partly
ecause some single parents remain on IS (as shown in Appendix E ) and
artly because some would have left IS in the absence of the LPO reform.
Table 6 reports the DiD estimates of the impact of the introduction
f work search requirements on the probability that a single parent re-
eived any of the main three out-of-work beneﬁts (IS, JSA, ESA). Three
onths after the predicted loss of entitlement to IS, LPO had reduced
he fraction of single parents receiving an out-of-work beneﬁt by 11 to
3 ppts (across Phases). This impact then rises over time, but relatively
lowly, so that none of the estimated impacts of LPO on the fraction of72 ingle parents receiving an out-of-work beneﬁt exceed 20pp by the end
f the observation window. 
The number of single parents moved oﬀ all out-of-work beneﬁts is
herefore considerably smaller than the number of single parents moved
ﬀ IS by the reform, and this is because the reform led single parents in
any cases to switch beneﬁts. Tables 7 and 8 report the DiD estimates
f the impact of LPO on the fraction receiving the unemployment bene-
t with search conditionalities (JSA), and on the fraction receiving the
ealth-related beneﬁt (ESA). LPO had little impact on the fraction of sin-
le parents receiving unemployment beneﬁts before the predicted loss
f entitlement to IS (see the ﬁrst two columns of Table 7 ), but LPO did
ause substantial ﬂows onto JSA after that: 3 months after the predicted
oss of IS entitlement, LPO had increased the fraction receiving JSA by
etween 24 ppts and 36 ppts across all sub-phases except the ﬁrst. This
mpact then falls over the observation period, especially for the single
arents in Phase 1. 
Table 8 shows that, 3 months after the predicted loss of entitlement
o IS, LPO had increased the fraction of single parents receiving ESA by
etween 10 and 14 pp; this impact is fairly stable after this. There is ev-
dence of considerable movement onto ESA in advance of the predicted
oss of entitlement to IS amongst single parents in Phase 1: we attribute
his to an unrelated but pre-announced reform to health-related bene-
ts that made it less attractive to start a claim of health-related beneﬁts
fter autumn 2008. 
Table 9 reports the DiD estimates of the impact of LPO on the proba-
ility of being in work. Three months after the loss of entitlement to IS,
he introduction of work search requirements is estimated to have in-
reased the share in work by around 7 percentage points. This estimated
mpact then rises slowly with time since time since the predicted loss of
ntitlement to IS, falling (for example) just short of 12pp 15 months
fter the loss of entitlement to IS in Phase 2. 
.2.1. Overview and discussion 
The results in Tables 5 –9 show a broadly consistent pattern across
hases. Overall, LPO increases the probability of leaving the uncondi-
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Table 5 
DiD estimates of impact of LPO on the probability of receiving IS at diﬀerent intervals relative to predicted loss of IS entitlement. 
Months since predicted loss of IS entitlement (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
− 9 − 6 + 3 + 9 + 12 + 15 + 24 
p1iS − 0.3 − 8.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 18.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 19.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 20.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 19.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 21.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.7) (1.5) (1.1) (1.0) (1.2) (1.6) 
p1aS − .8 ∗ − 10.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 48.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 47.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 36.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 22.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 21.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (2.7) (2.0) (1.6) 
p1aF − 2.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 8.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 51.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 48.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 47.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 45.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 31.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (2.2) 
p1bS − 1.7 ∗ ∗ − 11.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 51.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 50.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 49.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 47.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 43.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.8) 
p1bF − 1.5 ∗ ∗ − 4.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 51.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 51.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 50.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 49.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 45.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.5) (0.9) (1.2) (1.1) (0.8) (0.5) 
p2aS − .8 ∗ − 8.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 56.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 55.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 53.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 51.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.8) (0.6) 
p2aF − 2.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − − 8.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 59.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 55.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 54.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 53.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) (1.0) (0.9) 
p2bS − 1.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 7.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 58.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 56.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 54.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 44.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.6) (0.3) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) 
p2bF − .9 ∗ − 3.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 57.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 55.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 54.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 54.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.5) (0.5) (0.8) (0.7) (1.0) 
p3aS − .8 ∗ ∗ − 4.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 57.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 54.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.8) (0.8) (1.5) 
p3aF − 2.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 5.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 59.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 55.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.5) (0.6) (0.4) 
p3bS − 1.1 ∗ − 6.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 55.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.5) (0.9) (0.9) 
p3bF − .7 − 3.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 57.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.5) (0.7) 
p3cF − 1.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 3.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.6) 
all_phases1 − 1.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 9.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 46.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 45.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 42.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 37.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 28.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) (1.1) (1.0) (1.3) 
all_phases2 − 1.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 7.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 58.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 55.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 53.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 51.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.5) (0.4) (0.5) (0.6) (0.6) 
all_phases3 − 1.1 ∗ ∗ − 4.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 57.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 54.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.5) (0.6) (0.8) 
Notes: Sample construction and other covariates are described in the text. 
∗ p < .10 ∗ ∗ p < .05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01 
Standard errors are estimated following Donald and Lang (2007) , treating a “group” as the interaction of “treatment/comparison” and “cohort”. 
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t  
r  ional income support by over 50pp, but even at the end of our obser-
ation period the probability of being in work only increases by about
0pp. Most of this latter eﬀect is already evident shortly after the loss
f entitlement to IS. For example, in Phase 2 (Phase 3) over 60% (70%)
f the impact on work outcomes measured at the end of the observation
eriod has already occurred after 3 months. The impact of the reform
n the fraction of single parents claiming the unemployment beneﬁt,
SA, is large from the beginning, but not suﬃcient to account for the
ntire diﬀerence between the fraction pushed oﬀ IS and that moved
nto work. Instead, the reform has induced non-negligible ﬂows towards
ealth-related beneﬁts (which carry no search conditionalities), increas-
ng the probability that a single parent claims the health-related beneﬁts
y around 10pp three months after the regime change, a larger impact
han the impact on being in work, and towards non-claimant unemploy-
ent. 
The impacts in Phases 2 and 3 were similar to each other, 17 but those
n Phase 1 were diﬀerent, with the estimated impact of LPO on leaving
ut-of-work beneﬁts or moving into work being smaller for single par-
nts in Phase 1. This reﬂects several diﬀerences between the phases.
irst, the LPO reform represented a smaller policy change for single
arents in Phase 1, since their children were already close to the age
t which they would have lost entitlement to IS in the absence of the
eform (for example, single parents in “Phase 1a Stock ” lost their en-
itlement to IS at most 2 years and potentially as little as 1 day earlier
han they would have done had LPO not been introduced, but single par-
nts in “sub-phase 3b Flow ” lost IS entitlement 7 years earlier than they17 Nevertheless, they are generally statistically diﬀerent from each other. 
m  
b  
w  
73 ould have done had LPO not been introduced). Second, as discussed
arlier, the single parents in Phase 1 were also aﬀected by a reform to
ealth-related beneﬁts that gave an incentive for individuals to claim a
ealth-related beneﬁt before autumn 2008 to avoid a tougher medical
ssessment. Third, single parents in Phase 1 have older children (by con-
truction), and so tend to be older themselves, and so are less likely to
ave additional children. Finally, single parents in Phase 1 have tended
o have spent longer out of work, and so are more disadvantaged than
ingle parents in the later Phases. 
To provide an overview of the results so far, Fig. 5 plots the estimated
mpacts of the LPO reform on the probability of work (dashed line), the
robability of claiming health-related beneﬁts with no attached search
onditionalities, and the probability of being in non-claimant unemploy-
ent (computed as the impact on the probability that a single parent is
n any beneﬁt minus the impact on the probability of being in work).
n Phases 2 and 3, the impact of LPO on the probability of being in non-
laimant unemployment is at least 6pp by the end of the observation
eriod, and always amounts to a considerable fraction of the impact on
he probability of being work (plotted in Fig. 5 as a dashed black line).
or example, 9 months after the loss of entitlement to IS (which is the
ast observation point available for all three phases), the implied impact
n the probability of being in non-claimant unemployment is more than
0% of that on the probability of employment. 
The ﬂow towards non-claimant unemployment could also be due
o (i) people working less than 16 hours per week (who would not be
ecorded as in-work in our data) and (ii) people who were previously
aking a fraudulent claim of IS who then decide not to claim another
eneﬁt when they lose entitlement to IS. As discussed in Section 4.1 ,
e do not think that employment for less than 16 hours is likely to be
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Fig. 5. The impact of LPO on the probability that a lone parent is in work, on health-related beneﬁts or not in work nor on beneﬁts. 
Note: DiD estimates of the impact of LPO on diﬀerent outcomes. “Not in Work or on Beneﬁts ” is the diﬀerences between the eﬀect on the probability of being on IS and the sum of the 
eﬀects on the probability of being in work, on JSA and ESA. 
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Table 6 
DiD estimates of impact of LPO on the probability of receiving any out-of-work beneﬁt at diﬀerent intervals relative to predicted loss of IS 
entitlement. 
Months since predicted loss of IS entitlement (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
− 9 − 6 + 3 + 9 + 12 + 15 + 24 
p1iS − 0.6 − 4.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.6 ∗ − 2.0 ∗ − 3.1 ∗ ∗ − 3.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 5.6 ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.8) (0.6) (0.8) (0.8) (0.7) (1.3) 
p1aS − 1.0 ∗ ∗ − 7.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 11.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 13.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 11.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 7.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 7.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (2.3) (1.3) (1.2) 
p1aF − 2.0 ∗ ∗ − 5.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 11.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 13.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 14.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 14.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 11.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.5) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) (2.0) 
p1bS − 1.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 7.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 13.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 15.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 16.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 17.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 17.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.5) (0.8) 
p1bF − 1.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 2.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 10.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 13.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 15.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 15.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 16.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.5) (0.9) (1.1) (1.1) (0.9) (0.5) 
p2aS − 0.4 − 5.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 12.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 16.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 16.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 17.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.5) (0.6) (0.5) (0.7) (0.5) 
p2aF − 1.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 4.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 13.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 15.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 16.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 17.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) 
p2bS − .8 ∗ ∗ − 5.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 14.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 15.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 16.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 18.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.5) (0.2) (0.7) (0.7) (0.7) 
p2bF − 0.6 − 2.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 11.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 13.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 14.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 16.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0.7) (0.8) (0.8) 
p3aS − .6 ∗ ∗ − 3.3 ∗ ∗ − 12.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 15.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.7) (0.7) (1.4) 
p3aF − 1.5 ∗ ∗ − 3.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 11.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 14.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.5) (0.6) 
p3bS − 0.7 − 4.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 12.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.5) (0.8) (0.9) 
p3bF − 0.5 − 2.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 10.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.7) 
p3cF − .7 ∗ ∗ − 2.5 ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.6) 
all_phases1 − 1.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 6.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 11.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 12.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 13.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 12.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 10.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.5) (0.5) (0.4) (0.8) (0.6) (1.1) 
all_phases2 − .7 ∗ ∗ − 4.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 12.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 15.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 16.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 17.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.5) 
all_phases3 − .8 ∗ ∗ − 3.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 11.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 15.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.4) (0.5) (0.9) 
Notes: Sample construction and other covariates are described in the text. 
∗ p < .10 ∗ ∗ p < .05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01 
Standard errors are estimated following Donald and Lang (2007) , treating a “group” as the interaction of “treatment/comparison” and 
“cohort”. 
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m  ubstantial due to the disincentives built into the tax and beneﬁt sys-
em. 18 In Appendix C , we show that the estimated incidence of fraud-
lent claims is small. Moreover, as we discuss in the next section, we
nd that the ﬂow towards non-claimant unemployment is slightly larger
or lone parents who have spent more time on IS. We do not see obvi-
us reasons why the incidence of part-time employment or fraudulent
laims should be higher in this group. Furthermore, the results show a
ustained increase in the ﬂow towards health-related beneﬁts as well
or this group, which is again suggestive of mechanisms such as those
iscussed in Petrongolo (2009) rather than a higher propensity to take
p part-time employment or a disproportional rate of fraudulent claims.
The lighter area in Fig. 5 shows the eﬀect of LPO on the probabil-
ty that a lone parent claims health-related beneﬁts. It shows that the
ntroduction of work search requirements caused more single parents
o either claim health-related beneﬁts with no search conditionalities
r enter non-claimant unemployment than to enter employment (as the
um of the two grey areas is greater than the dashed line, except for the
ast observation period for phase 1). 
Overall, however, we stress that these results are consistent with
he predictions of a simple search model in which individuals with low
evel of initial search might give up searching and move to other bene-18 This is conﬁrmed from earlier qualitative work following lone parents leaving IS 
mong whom only a small minority ( < 5%) expressed a preference for working less 
han 16 h, with a spike wishing to work exactly 16 h. See https://www.gov.uk/ 
overnment/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ﬁle/214373/rrep818.pdf . 
t
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75 ts without search requirements (such as the health-related beneﬁts) or
nter non-claimant unemployment status ( Manning, 2009, Petrongolo,
009 ). 19 To further investigate the credibility of this interpretation we
ook in the next sub-section at the impact of the introduction of the work
earch requirements on single parents with diﬀerent degrees of initial
abour market attachment, as proxied by the proportion of time spent
n income support before the beginning of the observation period. 
We note that LPO began to be implemented during the recession
hat began in 2008. The unemployment rate grew for most of the pe-
iod covered by our data, and aggregate output did not return to pre-
ecession levels until well after the end of our observation period. The
iﬀerence-in-diﬀerences design means that our estimates of the reform’s
mpact have been purged of any impact of the macroeconomic condi-
ions common to lone parents with younger and older children, but it is
ossible that the impact of an LPO-like reform itself varies with the eco-
omic environment. The standard story is that activation policies that
ncrease eﬀective labour supply have less impact in downturns because
f labour demand constraints. If so, then the impact of LPO on employ-
ent outcomes in normal times could be greater than that presented19 Manning (2009) ﬁnds no evidence of increased search intensity following the in- 
roduction of work search requirements for the unemployed in the UK in 1996, and 
etrongolo (2009) ﬁnds a negative eﬀect of the probability of employment and positive 
ne on the probability of moving onto health-related beneﬁts. Petrongolo looks at all 
nemployed (not just single parents) and her identiﬁcation strategy compares claimants 
hose spell begins shortly before the introduction of JSA with claimants whose spell be- 
ins shortly after the introduction of JSA. 
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Table 7 
DiD estimates of impact of LPO on the probability of receiving JSA at diﬀerent intervals relative to predicted loss of IS entitlement. 
Months since predicted loss of IS entitlement (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
− 9 − 6 + 3 + 9 + 12 + 15 + 24 
p1iS − 0.1 1.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.0 ∗ ∗ 6.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.2 ∗ ∗ 5.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.2) (1.5) (1.2) (1.2) (1.5) (0.9) 
p1aS 0.0 1.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 24.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.0 ∗ ∗ 2.7 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) (1.0) (0.8) 
p1aF .2 ∗ ∗ 1.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 28.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 23.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 19.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.6) 
p1bS 0.0 2.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 27.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 23.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 19.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 14.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) 
p1bF 0.0 0.2 31.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 27.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 24.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 22.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 16.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
p2aS 0.0 1.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 31.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 25.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 23.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
p2aF .2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 34.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 27.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 25.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 23.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
p2bS 0.1 1.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 32.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 28.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 26.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 17.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
p2bF 0.0 0.0 34.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 29.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 27.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 24.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
p3aS 0.0 0.0 34.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 27.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) 
p3aF .2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 35.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 28.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) 
p3bS .1 ∗ ∗ 0.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 33.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) 
p3bF 0.0 .2 ∗ 36.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) 
p3cF .2 ∗ ∗ 0.0 
(0.0) (0.0) 
all_phases1 0.0 1.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 24.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 18.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 14.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6) (0.4) 
all_phases2 .1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 32.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 27.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 25.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 21.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) 
all_phases3 0.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ .5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 34.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 27.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) 
Notes: Sample construction and other covariates are described in the text. 
∗ p < .10 ∗ ∗ p < .05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01 
Standard errors are estimated following Donald and Lang (2007) , treating a “group” as the interaction of “treatment/comparison”
and “cohort”. 
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20 For the probability of being on any beneﬁts all but two diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients 
between the two extreme groups are statistical signiﬁcant (phase 2 and 3 at interval + 3). 
21 For the probability of being in work, only the diﬀerences between the coeﬃcients 
for the two extreme grops for phase 1 at interval + 3 and at interval + 12 are statistically 
signiﬁcant. 
22 For the probability of being on health-related beneﬁts all diﬀerences are statistically 
signiﬁcant except for that at interval + 24 for phase 1. ere. On the other hand, it is also plausible that the slowdown discour-
ged job searching among lone parents with younger children by more
han among the treated lone parents, and this would mean that the im-
act of LPO on employment outcomes in normal times could be lower
han that presented here. 
.3. Heterogeneous eﬀects by level of previous labour market attachment 
Table 10 presents estimates of the impact of work search require-
ents on subsamples of single parents, deﬁned by the proportion of
ime they had spent receiving the unconditional income support ben-
ﬁt in the 36 months before the observation period. We interpret this
ariable as measuring a lack of labour market attachment. We deﬁne
hree groups: those spending between 90% and 100% of the previous
6 months receiving IS (63% of all single parents in the sample); those
pending between 50% and 90% of the previous 36 months receiving IS
17% of the sample); those spending less than 50% of the previous 36
onths receiving IS (20% of the sample). Our interpretation of this vari-
ble as a lack of labour market attachment is conﬁrmed by data from
he pre-reform cohorts. This shows that (for example) 15 months into
he observation window, 14% of the group with the highest proportion
f time spent on IS are now in work across all phases; for the other two
roups the fraction in work after 15 months is above 22%. 
The ﬁrst three columns of Table 10 show that the introduction of
ork search requirements reduced the probability of being on any ben-
ﬁts by the largest magnitude for the group with the lowest level of
abour market attachment. The diﬀerences in the coeﬃcients between76 he two extreme groups are generally statistically signiﬁcant. 20 The fol-
owing three columns indicate that the impact on work was also greatest
or the group with the lowest labour market attachment – but the dif-
erences with the group with the highest labour market attachment are
enerally not statistically signiﬁcant. 21 However, the impact on receiv-
ng a health-related beneﬁts (with no search conditionalities) is also the
argest for the group with the lowest labour market attachment (and the
iﬀerences with the ﬁrst group are generally statistically signiﬁcant). 22 
he ﬁnal three columns consider the implied eﬀect on the probability
hat a single parent is in non-claimant unemployment (again, computed
s the diﬀerence between the impact on the probability of claiming any
eneﬁts and that of being in work). The diﬀerences across the three
roups with diﬀerent labour market attachments are not large, but there
re larger ﬂows towards non-claimant unemployment for the group with
he weakest labour market attachment later in the observation window
as shown in the lower rows in the table). Overall, the reform appears to
ave generated stronger ﬂows of single parents with low initial level of
abour market attachment both towards work and towards states with no
earch conditionalities, namely health-related beneﬁts and non-claimant
nemployment. 
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Table 8 
DiD estimates of impact of LPO on the probability of receiving a health-related beneﬁt (ESA/IB/SDA) at diﬀerent intervals relative 
to predicted loss of IS entitlement. 
Months since predicted loss of IS entitlement (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
− 9 − 6 + 3 + 9 + 12 + 15 + 24 
p1iS 1.0 ∗ ∗ 4.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.2 − 1.9 ∗ ∗ − 3.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 3.4 ∗ ∗ − 5.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.4) (0.5) (0.4) (0.6) (0.8) (1.0) 
p1aS 0.5 5.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 1.1 
(0.3) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.5) 
p1aF 1.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 14.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 13.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 5.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.6) 
p1bS 1.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (0.4) 
p1bF 1.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.5) (0.4) (0.4) (0.5) 
p2aS 0.5 ∗ ∗ 2.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) 
p2aF 0.4 1.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.3) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) 
p2bS − 0.1 0.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) 
p2bF 0.0 0.4 11.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.9) 
p3aS 0.0 0.4 ∗ ∗ 10.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.4) 
p3aF 0.1 ∗ 0.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.1) (0.2) (0.3) 
p3bS 0.0 0.3 9.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.2) (0.3) 
p3bF 0.0 0.1 10.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.1) (0.2) 
p3cF − 0.1 0.4 
(0.1) (0.3) 
all_phases1 1.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3) 
all_phases2 0.3 1.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2) 
all_phases3 0.0 0.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.0) (0.2) (0.3) 
Notes: Sample construction and other covariates are described in the text. 
∗ p < .10 ∗ ∗ p < .05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01 
Standard errors are estimated following Donald and Lang (2007) , treating a “group” as the interaction of “treatment/comparison”
and “cohort”. 
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23 On the other hand, neither of the papers examining WFTC examined whether the 
employment response varied by the age of children in the family; Blundell and Shep- 
hard (2012) , using data from the same period, conclude that lone parents with children 
over 5 have a higher participation elasticity than those under 5, so it is possible that the 
response to WFTC amongst lone parents with children aged 10 or over was greater than 
the headline 3.7 ppts. To assess the relative size of these eﬀects across the three groups,
ig. 6 plots the diﬀerence between the impact of LPO on the probability
f claiming health-related beneﬁts or of being in non-claimant unem-
loyment, and the probability of being in work (and so positive numbers
ndicate that LPO induced larger ﬂows towards one of the states with no
onditionalities than into work). It is very clear that the ﬂow towards
tates with no conditionalities attached is larger for the groups with the
owest level of initial labour market attachment, and this is true across
hases and observation periods. 
Overall, these ﬁndings are consistent with the predictions of the
earch model in Petrongolo (2009) : they indicate that work search re-
uirements have tended to push individuals with low levels of labour
arket attachment more towards beneﬁts with no search conditionali-
ies attached or into non-claimant unemployment than into work. There
s some suprising evidence that lone parents with low labour market
ttachment might have been more likely to move into work, but this
vidence appear statistically weaker. 
.4. Discussion 
It is interesting to compare the size of the estimated impacts to other
eforms aﬀecting lone parents. Appendix E does this for other interven-
ions in the UK that have aﬀected lone parents receiving welfare bene-
ts. It shows that LPO had a much greater (almost an order of magnitude
reater) impact than interventions that were voluntary, or that were re-
uiring lone parents only to meet with advisers (and not requiring them
o undertake any job search activity). 77 The other comparison is to in-work beneﬁts, which have histori-
ally been used to increase labour supply amongst lone parents: see
rewer et al. (2006), Francesconi and van der Klaauw (2007) , and
regg et al. (2009) for UK evidence on the Working Families ’ Tax Credit
or lone parents, and Nicols and Rothstein (2016) for a review of US
vidence on the Earned Income Tax Credit. Gregg et al. (2009) report
hat WFTC and contemporaneous reforms increased the probability of
mployment amongst all lone parents in the UK by 3.8 to 5.2 ppts, de-
ending on the choice of comparison group (taken from text on pF43;
he ﬁrst 2 columns of their Table 2 reports AMEs of 0.037 and 0.053),
nd Brewer et al. (2006) estimated that the same set of reforms increased
mployment by 3.7 ppts. Our estimated impact of the LPO reform on em-
loyment implies a considerably larger change in employment. Given a
re-reform employment rate of around 70 percent, and assuming that
he LPO reform does not aﬀect the rate of job loss of lone parents, and
hat all lone mothers not in work are on welfare beneﬁts, the estimated
ncrease in the ﬂow into work 12 months after the reform of 10.2 ppts
r 8.3 ppts (our Table 9 , results for Phase 2 and Phase 1 respectively)
orresponds to an 8 ppt increase in the employment rate of lone mothers
hose children are aged 10 to 11, and a 7 ppt increase in the employ-
ent rate of lone mothers whose children are aged to 15. 23 This simple
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Table 9 
DiD estimates of impact of LPO on the probability of being in work at diﬀerent intervals relative to predicted loss of IS entitlement. 
Months since predicted loss of IS entitlement (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
− 9 − 6 + 3 + 9 + 12 + 15 + 24 
p1iS 1.1 4.6 ∗ ∗ 3.5 4.9 5.4 5.7 9.6 
(0.2) (0.7) (1.3) (2.6) (3.1) (3.0) (5.8) 
p1aS 1.0 ∗ ∗ 6.3 ∗ 7.4 ∗ ∗ 8.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.2 ∗ ∗ 6.1 ∗ 7.6 
(0.0) (1.7) (1.2) (1.3) (2.0) (2.1) (4.3) 
p1aF 1.5 ∗ ∗ 3.2 ∗ ∗ 6.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.3 ∗ ∗ 
(0.0) (0.5) (0.2) (0.2) (0.5) (0.6) (2.1) 
p1bS 2.3 5.4 ∗ 7.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.5) (1.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.4) (0.7) (0.9) 
p1bF 1.1 1.9 ∗ ∗ 5.3 ∗ ∗ 7.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.4) (0.6) (0.9) (1.2) (1.0) (0.8) 
p2aS .4 ∗ ∗ 2.6 ∗ ∗ 6.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.4) (0.3) (0.7) (0.8) (0.9) 
p2aF .9 ∗ 2.8 ∗ ∗ 7.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.5) (0.4) (0.6) (0.5) (0.3) 
p2bS 0.6 3.8 8.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.5) (1.7) (0.1) (0.3) (0.4) (0.6) 
p2bF 0.5 2.0 ∗ ∗ 6.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 12.2 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.4) (0.2) (0.7) (0.6) (0.8) 
p3aS 0.5 2.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.6) (0.3) (0.8) (1.0) 
p3aF 1.2 ∗ ∗ 3.1 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.4) (0.3) (0.8) 
p3bS 0.6 3.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.4) (0.5) (0.5) 
p3bF 0.5 2.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.4 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.5) (0.4) 
p3cF 0.5 2.0 ∗ ∗ 
(0.3) (0.6) 
all_phases1 1.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 4.8 ∗ ∗ 6.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 8.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.0 ∗ ∗ 
(0.1) (0.5) (0.6) (0.4) (0.8) (1.5) (3.1) 
all_phases2 0.4 2.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 6.8 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.7 ∗ ∗ ∗ 10.3 ∗ ∗ ∗ 11.5 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.3) (0.2) (0.6) (0.4) (0.4) 
all_phases3 0.8 2.9 ∗ ∗ ∗ 7.0 ∗ ∗ ∗ 9.6 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.2) (0.4) (0.4) (0.7) 
Notes: Sample construction and other covariates are described in the text. 
∗ p < .10 ∗ ∗ p < .05 ∗ ∗ ∗ p < .01 
Standard errors are estimated following Donald and Lang (2007) , treating a “group” as the interaction of “treatment/comparison”
and “cohort”. 
Table 10 
The eﬀect of LPO on the probability of being in diﬀerent states by proportion of time spent on Income Support in the 36 months prior to the observation period. 
Any out-of-work beneﬁts Work ESA Non-claimant Unemployment (a) 
0–50 50–90 90–100 0–50 50–90 90–100 0–50 50–90 90–100 0–50 50–90 90–100 
Interval: + 3 
all_phases1 − .088 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .086 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .116 ∗ ∗ ∗ .038 ∗ .051 ∗ ∗ ∗ .075 ∗ ∗ ∗ .066 ∗ ∗ ∗ .089 ∗ ∗ ∗ .124 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.05 0.035 0.041 
(0.004) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.003) (0.011) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) 
all_phases2 − .111 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .114 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .123 ∗ ∗ ∗ .054 ∗ ∗ .058 ∗ ∗ ∗ .071 ∗ ∗ ∗ .075 ∗ ∗ ∗ .100 ∗ ∗ ∗ .141 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.057 0.056 0.052 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.002) (0.015) (0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
all_phases3 − .123 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .111 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .111 ∗ ∗ ∗ .073 ∗ ∗ ∗ .068 ∗ ∗ ∗ .066 ∗ ∗ ∗ .070 ∗ ∗ ∗ .085 ∗ ∗ ∗ .121 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.05 0.043 0.045 
(0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.013) (0.013) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) 
Interval: + 12 
all_phases1 − .089 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .096 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .139 ∗ ∗ ∗ .058 ∗ ∗ ∗ .065 ∗ ∗ .086 ∗ ∗ ∗ .057 ∗ ∗ ∗ .077 ∗ ∗ ∗ .098 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.031 0.031 0.053 
(0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
all_phases2 − .128 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .140 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .168 ∗ ∗ ∗ .076 ∗ ∗ .085 ∗ ∗ ∗ .111 ∗ ∗ ∗ .071 ∗ ∗ ∗ .097 ∗ ∗ ∗ .140 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.052 0.055 0.057 
(0.012) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Interval: + 15 
all_phases1 − .086 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .095 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .136 ∗ ∗ ∗ .066 ∗ ∗ ∗ .076 ∗ ∗ ∗ .092 ∗ ∗ ∗ .045 ∗ ∗ ∗ .064 ∗ ∗ ∗ .079 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.02 0.019 0.044 
(0.004) (0.012) (0.007) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) 
all_phases2 − .148 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .142 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .180 ∗ ∗ ∗ .095 ∗ ∗ ∗ .094 ∗ ∗ ∗ .121 ∗ ∗ ∗ .068 ∗ ∗ ∗ .093 ∗ ∗ ∗ .137 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.053 0.048 0.059 
(0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.016) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) 
Interval: + 24 
all_phases1 − .072 ∗ ∗ ∗ − .073 ∗ ∗ − .117 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.068 0.081 .094 ∗ ∗ 0.015 .023 ∗ .024 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.004 − 0.008 0.023 
(0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.033) (0.038) (0.029) (0.008) (0.010) (0.003) 
a: computed as minus the impact on Pr(AnyBen) plus the eﬀect on the probability of being in work. 
Results from linear probability models. Standard errors are estimated following Donald and Lang (2007) , treating a “group” as the interaction of “treatment/comparison” and “cohort”. 
Column headings indicate the proportion of time spent on IS before the start of the observation period by the single parents included in each sample. 
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Fig. 6. Diﬀerence between the eﬀects of search requirements (i) on the probability of moving onto health-related beneﬁts or non-claimant unemployment and (ii) on the probability of 
moving into work. Results by proportion of time spent on Income Support prior to the start of the observation period. 
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t  omparison of impact sizes is, of course, not an assessment of which pol-
cy should be preferred: the two sorts of policies are of a very diﬀerent
ature, not least because one is expanding the choice set of lone parents,
nd the other is reducing it. 
. Conclusion 
This paper presents new causal evidence on the eﬀects of work search
equirements on transitions into and out of work and receipt of diﬀer-
nt welfare beneﬁts for single parents, a growing group of great policy
elevance with a historically low level of labour market participation. 
We exploit the staggered roll-out of a reform recently implemented
n the UK known as “Lone Parents Obligations ” (LPO). In a series of
iscrete jumps, the reform gradually lowered the age of the youngest
hild which triggers a move from a regime of unconditional income sup-
ort to a regime with work search requirements. We use a diﬀerence-in-
iﬀerence setting with rich administrative data on beneﬁt receipt and
pells of employment, using single parents with younger children as an
naﬀected group, and using a long span of pre-reform data on single
arents with similarly-aged children. The staggered nature of this roll-
ut provides reassurance that our results are not due to time-varying
hocks aﬀecting the treatment or comparison groups. 
We show that the introduction of work search conditionalities did
ncrease the ﬂow of single parents into work, and the reform seems
o have had larger eﬀects than comparable interventions in the past.
owever, it also caused a large proportion of single mothers to move
nto health-related beneﬁts or into non-claimant unemployment (in the
ense that they are not observed either in work or on beneﬁts in our
ataset). In fact, the ﬂow towards either of the two states with no work
earch requirements attached is generally larger than that into work.
or example, 9 months after the loss of entitlement to the unconditional
ncome support, the reform has increased the probability that a previ-
usly welfare-receiving single parent is in work by about 10pp, but has
lso increased the probability of receiving either health-related bene-
ts or being in non-claimant unemployment by about 18pp. The nature
f this response is related to previous labour market experience: those
ith lower labour market attachment (proxied for by the fraction of time
 single parent has spent on welfare beneﬁts before being aﬀected by
he reform) are more likely to move into non-claimant unemployment
nd particularly onto health-related beneﬁts, than those with stronger
abour market attachment. 
Overall, these results echo the one of an increase in the proportion
f “detached ” mothers found in the US ( Blank, 2007 ) and are consis-
ent with the predictions of a simple search model in which individuals
ith low level of initial search might give up searching and move to
ther beneﬁts without search requirements (such as the health-related
eneﬁts) or enter non-claimant unemployment status ( Manning, 2009,
etrongolo, 2009 ). 
ppendix A. Further details on Lone Parent Obligations and other
elfare policy changes 
1. Further details on LPO 
As part of the LPO changes, single parents are provided with a range
f personalised support whilst out-of-work to help move closer to the
abour market and into work, as well as post-employment support once
hey move into work. This includes: 
- mandatory Final Year Quarterly Work Focused Interviews, in the
year preceding loss of Income Support entitlement. 
- A voluntary meeting with an adviser in the weeks before loss of In-
come Support entitlement, to assist with the changeover to another
beneﬁt, such as JSA or ESA. 24 24 Jobcentre Plus districts also had to run ‘Options and Choices’ events in the year LPO 
as introduced, informing single parents about the changes and the support available to 
t
n
80 - Additional ﬂexibilities for single parents claiming JSA in terms of
the hours they are required to work, for example. 
- Post employment support from an adviser or to cover unexpected
ﬁnancial emergencies in the ﬁrst months of moving into work. 
2. The jobseekers allowance regime, and sanctions 25 
To be entitled to Jobseeker’s Allowance, a lone parent must: 
• be available for work for at least 16 h a week. 
• Be actively seeking work. 
• Enter into a Jobseeker’s Agreement with Jobcentre Plus. The Agree-
ment sets out the claimant’s agreed availability, including any re-
strictions on their availability for work; the steps the claimant in-
tends to take to look for work; and the range of help to be provided
by Jobcentre Plus to help them ﬁnd work. 
Continuing entitlement is conditional on attending fortnightly meet-
ngs with an advisor. Failure to meet these conditions can lead to Job-
eeker’s Allowance to be disallowed. Payment of the beneﬁt can also
e suspended ( ‘sanctioned ’) for a period of time in various situations,
ncluding where the claimant: 
• Left their job voluntarily without good cause or lost their job through
misconduct. 
• Refused, failed to apply for or accept a job, without good cause. 
• Neglected to avail themselves of an employment opportunity. 
• Refused to carry out a ‘jobseeker’s direction ’ (i.e. an instruction from
a personal advisor). 
• Refused, failed to apply for or failed to attend a compulsory training
scheme or employment programme. 
The length of a sanction depends upon the situation, but can be for
p to 26 weeks. During this period, JSA would not be paid at all; other
eneﬁt entitlements would not be aﬀected. The number of sanctions as
 ratio of the number of recipients is shown in Fig. A1 . 
3. Other welfare policy changes 
Other policy changes will confound an impact evaluation if they af-
ect the treatment and comparison groups diﬀerently. In such a case, the
common trends ’ assumption underpinning the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
ethodology would not hold . In this appendix we discuss some relevant
olicies in more detail. 
JSA and Flexible New Deal (FND): In April 2009, the JSA regime
hanged, with a policy known as Flexible New Deal (FND), which af-
ected the support available to all JSA claimants. This initially applied
n certain Jobcentre Plus districts, with the remaining districts aﬀected
rom April 2010. The estimated impacts of LPO do not take explicit ac-
ount of FND, but the DiD regressions do control for Jobcentre Plus dis-
rict to allow for any diﬀerences at district level, and for these to change
ver time, as a way to account for the gradual roll-out of FND. This also
eans that the overall estimated impacts are eﬀectively averaged over
reas with and without FND. 
Incapacity Beneﬁt (IB) and Employment and Support Allowance
ESA): ESA replaced Incapacity Beneﬁt (IB) for new claimants from Oc-
ober 2008, just before LPO began. ESA claimants have to undergo a
ork Capability Assessment to assess whether their health condition
imits the work they are able to undertake. Single parents on IS before
he introduction of ESA and who may have had a work-limiting health
ondition may have a strong incentive to claim IB before October 2008,
fter which date IB was closed to new claimants, rather than wait until
he end of their IS entitlement and make an ESA claim. The estimatedhem, after which they had the discretion to run events if they considered there to be a 
eed for them. 
25 We draw on Kennedy (2010) . 
S. Avram et al. Labour Economics 51 (2018) 63–85 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
Fig. A1. Number of sanctions applied to lone parents receiving JSA as fraction of lone parents receiving JSA, by month. 
Source: authors ’ calculations based on data from StatXplore ( https://stat-xplore.dwp.gov.uk/webapi/jsf/dataCatalogueExplorer.xhtml ) and available from authors on request. 
i  
I  
t  
e
 
w  
f  
w  
p  
4  
a  
b  
a  
a  
d  
c
 
a  
p  
t  
h  
n  
e  
L  
e  
w  
A
 
i  
o
(  
t  
r  
w  
t  
a  
o  
m  
T  
A
 
m  
m  
r  
2  
o  
T  
i  
(  
r  
o  
i  
w  
f
A
C
s
 
w  
s  
r  
(  
c
 
a  
o  
r  
ampacts of LPO do not separate out this impact from the impact of LPO.
t is expected that the introduction of ESA would have mostly aﬀected
he early sub-phases of LPO, and might have resulted in greater than
xpected moves from IS to IB. 
In Work Credit (IWC) roll-out: In Work Credit, a payment of £40 a
eek (£60 in London) for the ﬁrst year of work (16 h and over a week)
or single parents who had been receiving IS or JSA for at least a year,
as available nationally between April 2008 and October 2012 . It was
reviously available in certain Jobcentre Plus districts, covering around
5% of single parents receiving IS. Therefore, the change in April 2008
ﬀected only single parents in districts that did not previously have IWC,
ut in these areas, the national roll-out of IWC aﬀected the treatment
nd comparison groups equally. The estimated impacts of LPO take no
ccount of IWC, but the DiD regressions do control for Jobcentre Plus
istrict to allow for any diﬀerences at district level, and for these to
hange over time, as a way to account for the gradual roll-out of IWC. 
The Work Programme: The Work Programme began in summer 2011
nd replaced Flexible New Deal and most other New Deal employment
rogrammes. Therefore, up until 30 September 2011 (the end point for
his analysis), it is possible that a small number of single parents may
ave entered the Work Programme during this time. However, it was
ot possible to determine this from the data used for this analysis. The
stimated impacts of LPO, therefore, do not separate out any impact of
PO from the impact of the Work Programme; equivalently, the overall
stimated impacts are eﬀectively averaged over those few single parents
ho were aﬀected by the Work Programme and the many who were not.
ppendix B. Fraudulent claims of welfare beneﬁts 
The main means-tested welfare beneﬁts and income-related tax cred-
ts in the UK are assessed on the joint income of a married couple, or
f a cohabiting couple who are “living together as husband and wife ”
this is the phrase used in legislation; its meaning has been established
hrough social security case law and practice). Many couples who are
eceiving means-tested welfare beneﬁts and income-related tax credits
ould have a higher entitlement to welfare or tax credits if they were
o claim (falsely) that only one adult was living in the household: this81 rises when any additional entitlement due through the presence of an-
ther adult is more than oﬀset by the loss of entitlement through the
eans-test taking into account that other adult’s own, private income.
his phenomenon is sometimes referred to as the “couple penalty ”: see
dam and Brewer, 2010 , for example (which we draw on here). 
Based on random audits, the relevant government department esti-
ates that, during the ﬁnancial year 2008–9, it wrongly paid out £93
illion in income support to working-age claimants fraudulently not
eporting the presence of a co-resident partner. This represents around
.9% of the total spending of Income Support for single parents (amount
f fraud from Table 6.1 of DWP, 2009a ; denominator derived from
able 9 of DWP, 2009b ); the DWP estimates that all types of fraud
ncreased its spending on Income Support for single parents by 4.7%
 Table 9 of DWP, 2009b ). The equivalent ﬁgures for those on income-
elated tax credits are considerably higher: HMRC estimates that 7.5%
f the claims for tax credits by a single parent contained fraudulent or
ncorrect non-reporting of the presence of a partner, and these claims
ere worth £580 m (see Table 8 of HMRC, 2010a , for the amount of
raud and Table 2.1 of HMRC, 2010b for the denominator). 
ppendix C. Further details on cleaning and using the WPLS data 
1. Resolving inconsistencies between start and end dates of claims and 
pells in the IS history ﬁle 
The IS History ﬁle contains information on IS claims, and the spells
ithin them. Each row in the dataset records information relating to a
peciﬁc “spell ”, where a spell within a claim should correspond to a pe-
iod of time within which the claimant’s circumstances were unchanged
and so a new spell should accompany a change in the claimant’s cir-
umstances). 
The dataset presented a number of inconsistencies, both between
nd within claims. These included overlapping spells within a claim,
r gaps between spells within a given claim. These inconsistencies were
esolved following systematic rules, summarised in the remainder of this
ppendix. The rules were informed by two principles: 
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26 If more than one was applicable, single parents were placed in the ﬁrst category. 
27 Single parents receiving IB when sampled were excluded from the sample, because 
they were exempt from LPO. The single parents in this category, then, must have started a 
claim of IB in the 12 months preceding the date when they would have lost IS entitlement, 
something which was possible only for single parents aﬀected by Phase 1 of LPO. 
28 There are some categories of single parents that were exempt from LPO that cannot 
be identiﬁed in our data. (a) The start-of-claim dates were assumed reliable, meaning that only
end-of-claim dates were adjusted to solve inconsistencies. 
(b) Within a claim, any pair of spells with consecutive dates (i.e.
when the end date of spell n is one day earlier than the start
date of spell n + 1) were considered more reliable than other,
possibly conﬂicting, spells. 
These are the steps taken in cleaning the IS history ﬁle: 
(1) Spells that appear to be identical duplicates were dropped from
the dataset. 
(2) End-of-claim date: 
a. Sort the spells within a claim by start date and end date. 
b. Consider the “Maximum Claim Date” associated with the last
spell(s). 
c. Set the maximum value as the End of Claim date. 
d. If there is no “Maximum Claim Date”, set the Claim as ongoing. 
e. Adjust the end-of-claim date to avoid an overlap with any follow-
ing claim. 
(3) The end of each spell is constrained to be less or equal to the end
of claim. 
(4) The start date of all ﬁrst spells (within a claim) is constrained to
be equal to the start of claim. 
(5) When there are conﬂicting “last spells” (multiple spells with the
same start date which appear at the end of the claim): 
a. Select the one for which end of spell is the same as end of claim.
b. If there are none, take the one with minimum diﬀerence between
end of spell and end of claim. 
c. If either of the two previous steps gives multiple candidates, the
candidate last in order is kept as the “last spell of the claim”. 
(6) Identify all the spells within a claim that appear consecutive (they
are only one day apart) even if they do not appear adjacent in the
dataset when the dataset is sorted by start of claim, start of spell
and end of spell. 
(7) Within each claim, start from the ﬁrst spell with at least one con-
secutive spell and apply the following rules: 
a. If the spell only has one successive consecutive spell, this latter
is selected. 
b. If the spell has multiple consecutive spells, select the one which
has a consecutive spell itself. If more than one has consecutive
spells, select the ﬁrst one. If none has a consecutive spell, select
the ﬁrst one as well. 
c. Now all spells which are in between two selected consecutive
spells are dropped. 
(8) In case of gaps between spells, extend the end date of the earlier
spell forwards in time. 
(9) In case of overlaps between spells, take back the end date of the
earlier spell. 
(10) The few spells which end up with negative duration are dropped.
2. Measuring the date of birth of youngest child 
A very important step of the analysis of this study is to select the sin-
le parents aﬀected by LPO in diﬀerent sub-phases. Whether and when
 single parent is aﬀected by LPO depends on the date of birth of their
oungest child. The IS History ﬁle does provide information on the date
f birth of youngest children, but there are often changes in the date of
irth of youngest children which appear implausible (both in the pattern
nd in the number of changes) and which are very likely to be the result
f reporting or recording errors. The following rules were followed to
erive a consistent value for the date of birth of youngest child: 
(1) The (relatively few) claims which were associated with more than
3 changes in date of birth of youngest child were dropped. In
the vast majority of cases these were self-evidently mistakes (for
example, when four diﬀerent date of births were recorded with
the same day and month but varying years). 82 (2) The two most recent date of births were selected (note: not nec-
essarily the two most recently reported ones). 
(3) If the earlier of the two selected dates of birth implied that the
single parent should be included in a given group, then that was
selected as the relevant date of birth. 
(4) If a single parent was not eligible for inclusion in a given group
based on the earlier date of birth, it was checked whether she
would be eligible based on the more recent date of birth. 
2.1. Using the tax credit data set to measure whether working 16 or more
ours 
The extract of data on tax credits contained information of spells of
ntitlement to the working tax credit (WTC), spells of entitlement to
he child tax credit (CTC) and information on hours worked per week.
ithin the spells of entitlement to WTC and CTC, there were sub-spells
orresponding to entitlement to the diﬀerent elements of WTC and CTC.
here were inconsistencies within and between all these pieces of infor-
ation. For example 
• within a spell of entitlement to WTC, it was possible to ﬁnd people
entitled to no elements of WTC (which should not happen) as well
as people entitled to both the “single parent” and the “second adult”
element (which is clearly not possible). 
• Spells of entitlement to CTC did not always match spells of entitle-
ment to WTC. 
• Information on hours worked was not always consistent with spells
of entitlement to WTC. 
In this report, the measure of work was taken from the spells of hours
orked reported by single parents, and not from the spells of entitlement
o WTC. 
ppendix D. Further analysis and descriptive evidence 
1. Characteristics of those single parents remaining on IS 
This sub-section analyses the characteristics of those single parents
ho remain on IS after the predicted date of loss of IS entitlement. 
About 10% of single parents in the sample were still receiving IS six
onths after the date on which they were predicted to lose IS entitle-
ent. There are three reasons why this could occur: 
• It could reﬂect that the single parent is exempt from LPO. 
• It could reﬂect inaccuracies in the data which mean that either the
date on which they should have lost IS entitlement is wrongly pre-
dicted, or the data wrongly suggests that they have not left IS when
in fact they have. 
• It could reﬂect a mistake in the operation of the LPO policy in prac-
tice indicating they should have lost entitlement to IS, but didn’t. 
Tables 1 and 2 provide breakdowns for the following mutually-
xclusive categories : 26 
• Receiving Carer’s Allowance along with IS. 
• Receiving IS but not as a single parent, either because the claim is
now from a couple, or because there are no dependent children. 
• Receiving IS with a younger child 
• Receiving Incapacity Beneﬁt along with IS. 27 
• None of the above, ie there was no identiﬁable reason why the single
parent was still receiving IS. 
Overall though, there was no identiﬁable reason why the single par-
nt was still receiving IS in around a third of cases (across phases). 28 
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Table 11 
Reasons for remaining on IS after date when predicted to lose IS entitlement, Phase 1. 
18 months after sampled (6 months 
after IS end date) 
27 months after sampled (15 months 
after IS end date) 
36 months after sampled (24 months 
after IS end date) 
Receiving Carer’s Allowance 23% 29% 31% 
No longer a single parent 3% 4% 7% 
With a younger child 9% 9% 8% 
Receiving ESA/IB/SDA 28% 27% 27% 
No apparent reason 37% 31% 27% 
All cases 100% 100% 100% 
(as fraction of all potentially eligible) 15,757 14,756 12,284 
(14%) (13%) (11%) 
Table 12 
Reasons for remaining on IS after date when predicted to lose IS entitlement, Phase 2 and 3. 
Phase 2 27 months after sampled (15 months Phase 3 
18 months after sampled (6 months after IS end date) 18 months after sampled (6 months 
after IS end date) after IS end date) 
Receiving Carer’s Allowance 37% 44% 27% 
No longer a single parent 1% 1% 1% 
With a younger child 24% 21% 36% 
Receiving ESA/IB/SDA 1% 1% < 1% 
No apparent reason 36% 32% 36% 
All cases 100% 100% 100% 
(as fraction of all potentially eligible) 8619 5364 13,390 
(10%) (8%) (8%)) 
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 Amongst Phase 1 single parents, very few continue to receive IS be-
ause they have since had another child, but some continue to receive
S as single adults (this could happen if they claimed the pre-2008 dis-
bility beneﬁt, known as Incapacity Beneﬁt (IB)). In Phase 2, slightly
ore had started a claim for Carer’s Allowance and slightly fewer were
o longer single parents. Compared to Phase 1, more parents in Phase 2
ere observed to be receiving IS and having a younger child. For single
arents in Phase 3, there was no identiﬁable reason why the single par-
nt was still receiving IS in around a third of cases, with roughly equal
ractions of the remainder having started a claim of Carer’s Allowance
r having had a younger child. 
2. Single parents who are not in work and not receiving any out-of-work 
eneﬁts 
Fig. 7 shows what fraction of these (possibly former) single parents
all into one of the following mutually exclusive categories : 29 
• working fewer than 16 h/week themselves, but living as a cou-
ple that was entitled to WTC due to their partner working at least
16 h/week 
• recorded as entitled to WTC as a single adult but without report-
ing work of 16 or more hours (this would suggest an inconsistency
between the data on “entitlements to WTC” and the data on hours
worked recorded in the tax credit administrative data). 
• receiving Child Tax Credit and working fewer than 16 h/week. 
• receiving no other working age beneﬁts or tax credits in their own
right 
The ﬁgure shows that (across the 3 Phases) between 70% and 90%
f this group are either not receiving any state support or receiving only
hild tax credits. 30 However, amongst those appearing to receive no
tate support it is not possible to tell, how many no longer have a de-
endent child (something that substantially reduces entitlements to ben-29 Single parents were put into the ﬁrst category that applied. 
30 It is not possible to tell, amongst those appearing to receive no state support, how 
any no longer have a dependent child (something that substantially reduces entitlements 
o beneﬁts) or how many have re-partnered but without claiming tax credits. It is also not 
ossible to tell whether any of these (former) single parents went on to be the partner of 
 claimant of an out-of-work beneﬁt. 
 
w  
v  
83 ﬁts) or how many have re-partnered but without claiming tax credits.
t is also not possible to tell whether any of these (former) single parents
ent on to be the partner of a claimant of an out-of-work beneﬁt. 
ppendix E. Comparison with other programmes for single 
arents in the UK 31 
Comparison of our estimated eﬀects with those of other programmes
s complicated by the variation in outcome measures and population
f interest. We therefore focus on just on evaluations of programmes
imed at single parents in the UK, and we have also to focus on the
mpact on receipt of IS, as earlier studies could not look at the impact on
mployment, and did not systematically consider the impact on health-
elated beneﬁts. 
Our headline estimates are that LPO reduced the fraction of single
arents receiving an out-of-work beneﬁt by − 12.8 at nine months (in
hase 1), and by − 15.7 at nine months in Phase 2. These are consid-
rably higher than the estimated impacts of three previous UK reforms
ﬀecting single parents receiving welfare beneﬁts: 
• The estimated impact of the Lone Parent Pilots (a set of reforms
dominated by a back-to-work bonus of £40 a week for the ﬁrst 52
weeks of work) amongst lone parents who had been on IS for 12
months was 1.6 ppts after 12 months, and 2.0 ppts after 24 months
( Brewer et al., 2009 ). 
• the estimated impact of a reform known as Work Focused Interviews
(WFI), which required single parents on welfare to meet with a case-
worker at 6 or 12 month intervals; after 12 months, was 0.8% for sin-
gle parents with youngest children aged over 13 and 2.0% for single
parents with youngest children aged 9–12 ( Cebulla et al., 2008 ). 
• The estimated impact of the New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP),
which oﬀered a voluntary programme of work search counselling
amongst all single parents (not just those who participated) on IS was
1.7 percentage points after nine months and 1.4 percentage points
after 24 months ( Cebulla et al., 2008 ). 
Of these interventions, two are mandatory (WFIs and LPO) and two
ere voluntary programmes (NDLP and IWC). Of the mandatory inter-
entions, LPO is clearly much more eﬀective at moving single parents31 This draws on chapter 5 of Avram et al. (2013) . 
S. Avram et al. Labour Economics 51 (2018) 63–85 
Fig. 7. Outcomes for single parents not receiving any of ESA/IB/SDA, CA, IS, JSA and not reporting work of 16 + hours when claiming tax credits, by Phase (top = Phase 1, bottom = Phase 
3). 
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 ﬀ out-of-work beneﬁts and into work than are WFIs. This is fully in
ine with the considerable diﬀerence in intensity (and conditionality
ssociated with diﬀerent beneﬁts) underpinning the two interventions.
he two voluntary programmes have higher estimated impacts amongst
heir participants, but this is not the relevant way to measure their ef-
ectiveness when compared with a mandatory programme like LPO. 
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